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Comment
THE "OPPORTUNITY" TEST OF STONE V. POWELL:
TOWARD A REDEFINITION OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The federal writ of habeas corpus has traditionally afforded a.
mechanism whereby the constitutional defects of a criminal conviction may
be collaterally attacked.' Its function is to test "the legality of the detention
of one in the custody of another" 2 by providing a federal corrective
proceeding designed to ensure reliable and consistent constitutional
adjudication.3 To achieve this end in compliance with the constitutional
command against suspension of this writ,4 Congress conferred upon the
federal courts the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus to state and
federal prisoners detained in violation of federal law. 5 Since this broad

1. See Developments in the Law - Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L.*REv.
1038, 1040 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Developments]. Chief Justice Marshall observed
that "[t]he writ of habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ, known to the common

law, the great object of which is the liberation of those who may be imprisoned
without sufficient cause." Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). More
recently this purpose was reaffirmed as follows:
The writ of habeas corpus is a procedural device for subjecting executive,
judicial, or private restraints on liberty to judicial scrutiny. Where it is available,
it assures among other things that a prisoner may require his jailer to justify the
detention under the law .... [T]his high purpose has made the writ both the
symbol and guardian of individual liberty.
Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 58 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
2. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934).
3. See Developments, supra note 1, at 1040-42. Federal habeas review serves this
function by permitting the federal courts to supervise the administration of
constitutional standards by state courts. Id. at 1040. The "guiding institutional
assumption" underlying this two-tiered system is the need "for a corrective proceeding
detached from the guilt-determining process and lodged in a federal forum." Id. The
countervailing interest in finality of criminal litigation has encouraged the
development of doctrines that require state courts to fully exhaust their own corrective
processes before resort to federal habeas court is allowed. Id. at 1040-41. See generally
Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners,76
HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963).
4. Article I, section 9 of the United States Constitution guarantees against
suspension of the "[p]rivilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9,

cl.

2.
5. See Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § I, 14 Stat. 385 (current version at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 (1970)). See Bator, supra note 3, at 445. The First Judiciary Act authorized
federal courts to issue the writ under certain circumstances. See Judiciary Act of Sept.
24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73, 81, 82. It thus has long been established that the
jurisdiction of the federal courts to grant the writ proceeds directly from a statutory
grant and not from the inherent power of the federal judiciary. See Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Crunch) 75, 93-94 (1807).
The principles governing the exercise of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction are
codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1970). For purposes of this article, the language of

(1095)
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statutory mandate subjects the grant of federal habeas relief to the
discretion of the federal courts, 6 the standards governing the exercise of that
discretion in accordance with due process determine the propriety of federal
habeas relief. The development and application of these standards are of
particular importance to those federal or state prisoners for whom the
federal habeas court serves as the last resort to remedy violations of their
7
constitutional rights.
In its recent decision in Stone v. Powell,8 the Supreme Court established
a new standard for determining the reviewability of state prisoners' fourth
amendment 9 claims of unconstitutional detention under the habeas corpus
jurisdiction of the federal courts.10 In a clear departure from the firmly
established principle that collateral relief in federal court is available to
rectify any constitutional deprivation, 1 ' the Stone Court held that "where

§ 2254, relating to habeas relief for state prisoners, deserves close attention. Section

2254 provides in pertinent part:
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall
entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.
Id. § 2254(a). Federal prisoners may utilize a comparable statutory remedy under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
6. This discretion is circumscribed by the limitations imposed upon the federal
courts by statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 & 2254 (1970). These limitations are general,
however, and leave to the courts the responsibility for deciding the circumstances
under which the grant of habeas relief is appropriate. See note 5 supra. See generally
Developments, supra note 1, at 1045-62.
7. One commentator has noted that "[t]he importance of the expanded federal
habeas jurisdiction has been magnified by the growth of fourteenth amendment due
process doctrines." Developments, supra note 1, at 1041. Since the application of much
of the Bill of Rights to the states brought the states' criminal processes under closer
federal supervision, state prisoners whose constitutional claims are rejected throughout the state court system and on certiorari to the Supreme Court have often looked to
the federal district courts for habeas relief. Id.
8. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). For a discussion of the Stone decision, see notes 27-43 and
accompanying text infra.
9. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
The "exclusionary rule" is a "judically created means of effectuating the
rights secured by the Fourth Amendment." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482 (1976).
The rule bars the use at trial of evidence obtained as a result of an unconstitutional
search or seizure. Id. at 483. It was first articulated in the context of federal
proceedings in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applicable to the states through the operation of the
fourth and fourteenth amendments).
10. See 428 U.S. at 494.
11. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443,446-50 (1953). In Brown, the scope of habeas
corpus jurisdiction was expanded to include all federal constitutional claims raised by
state prisoners. Id. Prior to Brown, the inquiry under federal habeas review related to
the adequacy of the process whereby the federal questions at issue were resolved. See
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the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a Fourth
Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas
corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
12
search or seizure was introduced at his trial."'
Subsequent to Stone, lower federal courts considering the reviewability
of state prisoners' fourth amendment claims on habeas corpus have
encountered difficulty determining when the "opportunity for a full and fair
litigation" of such claims has been afforded a state prisoner.' 3 It is
submitted that the resolution of this seminal issue will have a drastic and
far-reaching impact, since a finding that the state court afforded a prisoner
the opportunity for a full and fair consideration of his fourth amendment
claim will have the effect of preventing the exercise of federal court review.' 4
The apparent command of Stone to federal courts is to grant habeas
corpus review of fourth amendment claims only where the habeas petitioner
attacks the process whereby the result of a state court adjudication was
achieved.' 5 Specifically, only those claims relating to the fullness and
fairness of the opportunity to litigate in state court, not the result of the state

Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) (federal habeas review appropriate where state
failed to provide adequate "corrective process"). The Brown Court held that a state
prisoner was entitled to full reconsideration on federal habeas corpus of his fifth and
fourteenth amendment claims despite the apparent adequacy of the state corrective
process. 344 U.S. at 460-65. Brown therefore established the rule that a
federal habeas petitioner who claims he is detained pursuant to a final judgment
of a state court in violation of the U.S. Constitution is entitled to have the federal
habeas court make its own independent determination of his federal claim,
without being bound by the determination on the merits of that claim reached in
the state proceedings.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977). For a discussion of Wainwright, the most
recent case concerning the scope of federal habeas jurisdiction, see notes 132-48 and
accompanying text infra.
In Brown and one of its companion cases, Daniels v. Allen, state prisoners
petitioned for federal habeas relief on the grounds that the trial courts improperly
admitted into evidence certain confessions and ignored discrimination in the selection
of jurors. 344 U.S. at 466-76, 482-83. The Court ruled that Brown was entitled to
reconsideration of his claims in federal court notwithstanding the rejection of these
claims on direct appeal to the highest state court. Id. at 466-76. In Daniels, however,
the Court refused to reconsider the claims of a petitioner whose failure to comply with
state procedural rules relating to the timely filing of an appeal to the state appellate
court was deemed sufficient to bar federal habeas review. Id. at 486-87.
12. 428 U.S. at 494 (footnotes omitted).
13. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
14. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977). See text accompanying notes 70-93 infra.
15. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). Stone has been interpreted to
mean that federal habeas relief is appropriate where available state procedures were
insufficient to allow the state court to "meaningfully consider" the defendant's claim.
See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830, 844 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Oakes, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); United States ex rel. Conroy v.
Bombard, 426 F. Supp. 97, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also Sandoval v. Aaron, 562 F.2d
13 (10th Cir. 1977); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1976).
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court adjudication, appear to be cognizable after Stone.1 6 Generally,
however, state prisoners have sought habeas relief after Stone not by
attacking state procedures as such, but by challenging the use of those
procedures to deny substantive rights in their particular case. 17 Federal
courts have therefore been required to interpret the content and meaning of
Stone's "opportunity" test rather than rigidly apply the process/substance
distinction suggested above.
The problems of delineating the contours of the "opportunity" test have
arisen in two basic factual contexts: 1) where the defendant fails to
properly raise his fourth amendment claim in state court notwithstanding
the availability of adequate state procedures, and consequently the court
never considers the merits of that claim;' 8 and 2) where the defendant
presents his claim in state court and the court resolves the claim on its
merits but applies an erroneous constitutional standard. 19 This comment
will discuss the lower federal court decisions applying Stone in the context
of this categorical framework in an effort to discover whether Stone's
ambiguous "opportunity" test has been invested with any discernible
structure.
II.

THE Stone DECISION

20
In 1953, the landmark Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Alien
established that all federal constitutional questions raised by state prisoners
were reviewable on federal habeas corpus. 21 Almost twenty years later the
Court, in Kaufman v. United States,22 decided that all constitutional claims
in federal habeas corpus proceedings initiated by federal prisoners were
cognizable. 23 In light of these sweeping decisions, the availability of federal
habeas review has not been a function of the particular type of constitutional issue sought to be raised in a collateral attack. 24 Before Stone, the

16. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc) (Oakes, J.,
concurring), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); Sandoval v. Aaron, 562 F.2d 13 (10th
Cir. 1977).
17. See, e.g., Simpson v. Kreiger, 565 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Moore v. Cowan, 560
F.2d 1298 (6th Cir. 1977); Maxey v. Morris, 440 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Ill. 1977).
18. See notes 62-166 and accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 167-212 and accompanying text infra.
20. 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See note 11 supra.
21. 344 U.S. at 446-50. Section 2241 of the Judicial Code empowers federal district
courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to prisoners in custody in violation of the
Constitution. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (1970). Under this jurisdictional grant, the Brown
Court held that federal courts could redetermine the merits of a constitutional claim
even after it had been fully and fairly adjudicated by the state courts. 344 U.S. at 508.
22. 394 U.S. 217 (1969).
23. Id. In Kaufman, a federal prisoner argued that federal habeas review should
be available to redress his claim that evidence admitted at trial was unconstitutionally seized. Id. at 218-20. Although his trial counsel had properly objected to the
admission of this evidence, the habeas petitioner was unable to secure review of this
question on direct appellate review. Id. at 220 n.3. The Court concluded, as a matter of
statutory construction, that there was no basis for restricting "access by federal
prisoners with illegal search-and-seizure claims to federal collateral remedies, while
placing no similar restriction on access by state prisoners." Id. at 226.
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Supreme Court had confirmed the availability of the federal habeas forum to
consider state prisoners' claims of admission at trial of illegally seized
25
evidence without discussing the type of constitutional issue in question.
The Stone Court, however, adopted a "novel interpretation" of the habeas
statutes "without expressly overruling or distinguishing any of [this]
' 26
diametrically contrary precedent.
The Stone decision consolidated two cases involving murder convictions
in state courts based on evidence obtained by searches and seizures alleged
27
by the habeas petitioners to have violated their fourth amendment rights.
After the state courts had rejected the petitioners' contentions that the
fourth amendment prevented the admission of this evidence, 28 each
petitioner obtained a writ of federal habeas corpus pursuant to review of the
29
merits of these fourth amendment claims by the federal courts.

24. The relevant inquiry under Brown focuses on whether the constitutional
claim, regardless of its constitutional source, bears upon the validity of the conviction.
See Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, ProceduralDefault and The Burger Court, 126 U. PA.
L. REv. 473, 497 (1978).

25. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364
(1968); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). But see Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
481 n.15 (1976).
26. 428 U.S. at 519 n.14 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 469-74.
28. Id. at 468. In one of these cases, Stone v. Powell, the habeas petitioner was
arrested for violation of a city vagrancy ordinance which he alleged was unconstitutional. Id. at 469-70. The subsequent search incident to the arrest revealed a revolver
which was later discovered to have been the weapon used in a murder committed
shortly before petitioner's arrest, and this evidence was later deemed sufficient to
convict petitioner of second-degree murder. Id. at 470. The state appellate court held
that the police officer's testimony regarding the search and discovery of the weapon
was at most harmless error and refused to consider whether the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague. Id. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (before a
constitutional error can be held to be harmless, court must find it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
In the companion case to Stone, Wolff v. Rice, the habeas petitioner
challenged the sufficiency of a search warrant authorizing the search of his home. 428
U.S. at 472-73. The trial court denied petitioner's motion to suppress the incriminating evidence derived from this search. Id. at 472. On appeal, the Supreme Court of
Nebraska concluded that the affidavit supporting the warrant demonstrated
sufficient probable cause for issuance of the warrant when considered in light of the
testimony adduced at the suppression hearing. State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 738-39, 199
N.W.2d 480, 487-88 (1972).
29. 428 U.S. at 468-69. In Stone v. Powell, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's conclusions concerning the constitutionality of the vagrancy ordinance and the probable cause for arrest, and granted habeas
relief. Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The court
conducted an independent review of the evidence and concluded that the admission of
the illegally seized evidence was not harmless error. 507 F.2d at 99.
Petitioner Rice persuaded the United States District Court for the District of
Nebraska that the search warrant in his case was invalid because of the deficiencies
of the supporting affidavit and the absence of exigent circumstances. Rice v. Wolff,
388 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), reu'd sub nom.
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Justice Powell's majority opinion first examined the historical frame30
work within which federal habeas jurisdiction had gradually expanded.
Noting that it had never directly considered "whether exceptions to full
review [of all claims involving constitutional questions] might exist with
respect to particular categories of constitutional claims," 31 the Court
32
distinguished between claims derived from a "judicially created remedy"
and those which arose from a "personal constitutional right. '33 The Court
characterized the exclusionary rule as "a judicially created means of
effectuating the rights secured by the Fourth Amendment," apparently

30. 428 U.S. at 474-82. Justice Powell interpreted the Brown decision and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), as significantly expanding the scope of habeas corpus relief.
428 U.S. at 476-78. One commentator on Stone has pointed out that this position
reflects substantial disagreement with the reading of habeas corpus development set
forth in Fay. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV.56, 214 n.10 (1976).
For a discussion of the Fay decision, see note 91 infra.
31. 428 U.S. at 478-79. The majority noted that many lower federal court
decisions had concluded that collateral review of fourth amendment claims filed by
federal prisoners was inappropriate under § 2255 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970). 428 U.S. at 479. According to the Court, the rationale behind this view
proposed that search and seizure claims are unique because they do not "impugn the
integrity of the fact-finding process or challenge evidence as inherently unreliable;
rather, the exclusion of illegally seized evidence is simply a prophylatic device
intended generally to deter Fourth Amendment violations by law enforcement
officers." Id. at 479, quoting Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 224 (1969).
32. 428 U.S. at 486, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
Although the Court did not supply a definition of this term, the characterization of the
exclusionary rule in this manner was apparently intended to signify that such a
"remedy" was entitled to a lesser degree of protection than should be accorded a
constitutional "right". The distinction between the two is related to the purposes each
is intended to serve. A judicially created "remedy" such as the exclusionary rule is
designed "to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only
effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it." Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960). The rule does not provide a means to redress
the injury to the privacy of an illegal search victim. In contrast, a "personal
constitutional right" is intended to protect the interests of the aggrieved party by
focusing on his particular predicament and accommodating his specific needs. See
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974).
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Brennan objected to the description of the
exclusionary rule as "a judicially created remedy." 428 U.S. at 510 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). He had made the same criticism in Calandra, in which he warned
prophetically that "[f]or the first time, the Court today discounts to the point of

extinction the vital function of the rule to insure that the judiciary avoid even the
slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government conduct." 414 U.S. at 360
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
33. 428 U.S. at 486. Without citing support for this proposition, the Stone Court
stated that "[plost-Mapp decisions have established that the [exclusionary] rule is not

a personal constitutional right." Id.

In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the distinction between "a
judicially created remedy" and "a personal constitutional right" was one of form and
not substance. Id. at 510-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). At the heart of the dissent's
refutation of this distinction lay the fact that the exclusionary rule, mandating that
evidence obtained in an illegal search or seizure be excluded at trial, is constitutionally based. Id. at 514 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Since a defendant convicted on the
basis of unconstitutionally seized evidence is clearly "in custody in violation of the

Constitution" under § 2241, it is submitted that the majority's distinction does not
logically justify the Court's hostility to federal jurisdiction to redress violations of
fourth amendment rights.
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intending to signify that the exclusionary rule was a "remedy" entitled to
lesser protection than a constitutional right. 34 Contrasting the deterrent
purpose of this rule with the notion that its usefulness as a remedial device
should be limited "to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought
most efficaciously served," 35 Justice Powell employed a cost/benefit
analysis to determine whether fourth amendment questions on federal
36
habeas review should be addressed on the merits.
The majority posited that the long recognized cost of the exclusionary
rule was its tendency to "[deflect] the truthfinding process and often [free]
the guilty.

' 37

In addition, the majority noted that federal collateral review of

exclusionary rule claims would inevitably impose additional costs to those
incurred at trial and on direct review, including ineffective use of limited

34. 428 U.S. at 482.
35. Id. at 486, quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
36. 428 U.S. at 487-89. This cost/benefit analysis was apparently derived from
the Court's decision in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974). In Calandra,
the Court considered whether a grand jury witness could object to questioning based
on illegally seized evidence. Id. at 341-42. Weighing "the potential injury to the
historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the
[exclusionary] rule as applied in this context," the Court concluded that allowing a
grand jury witness to invoke the rule would "unduly interfere with the effective and
expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties." Id. at 349-50.
The functional approach inherent in this cost/benefit analysis has been
criticized as inconsistent with the symbolic qualities of constitutional rights. Cover &
Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L. J. 1035,
1091-95 (1977). The conceptualization of rights entirely in functional terms "also
represents a transition from the discourse of rights to that of interests." Id. at 1092. It
has thus been argued that a functional inquiry into a right's consequences for
accuracy should not be permitted to "crystallize a functionalist reduction of the right's
content." Id.
In his dissent in Stone, Justice Brennan criticized the majority's reliance on
the functional approach to ordering constitutional rights on similar grounds:
The Court ...argues that habeas relief for non-"guilt-related" constitutional
claims is not mandated because such claims do not affect the "basic justice" of a
defendant's detention ... ; this is presumably because the "ultimate goal" of the
criminal justice system is "truth and justice." This denigration of constitutional
guarantees and constitutionally mandatedprocedures, relegated by the Court to
the status of mere utilitarian tools, must appall citizens taught to expect judicial
respect and support for their constitutional rights. Even if punishment of the
"guilty" were society's highest value - and procedural safeguards denigrated to
this end - in a constitution that a majority of the members of this Court would
prefer, that is not the ordering of priorities under the Constitution forged by the
Framers, and this Court's sworn duty is to uphold that Constitution and not to
frame its own. The procedural safeguards mandated in the Framers' Constitution are not admonitions to be tolerated only to the extent they serve functional
purposes that ensure that the "guilty" are punished and the "innocent" freed;
rather, every guarantee enshrined in the Constitution, our basic charter and the
guarantor of our most precious liberties, is by it endowed with an independent
vitality and value, and this Court is not free to curtail those constitutional
guarantees even to punish the most obviously guilty.
428 U.S. at 523-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis in original).
37. 428 U.S. at 490. See Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A
Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 388-89 (1964) (application of exclusionary rule
"beyond the confines of necessity" harms the public interest).
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judicial resources, disruption of finality in criminal trials, friction between
38
state and federal courts, and disruption of the balance of federalism.
Contrasted against the alleged minimal incremental deterrent effect of
applying the rule on federal habeas review,3 9 Justice Powell concluded that
these costs far outweighed any benefits relating to the furtherance of fourth
amendment rights absent a showing that the opportunity to litigate a fourth
amendment claim was denied. 40 Restricting the availability of the federal
habeas forum to only those petitioners demonstrating both a fourth
amendment violation and denial of a full and fair opportunity to have that
violation rectified in state court was therefore consistent, in the majority's
view, with both the purposes and rationale of the exclusionary rule and
habeas corpus jurisdiction. 4

38. 428 U.S. at 491 n.31, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). See also The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30,
at 215.
39. In the Court's judgment, the view that federal habeas review would facilitate
deterrence of fourth amendment violations "rests on the dubious assumption that law
enforcement authorities would fear that federal habeas review might reveal flaws in a
search or seizure that went undetected at trial and on appeal." 428 U.S. at 493
(footnote omitted). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 389 (with increasing
application, deterrent effect of exclusionary rule reaches a point of diminishing
returns).
40. 428 U.S. at 494-95.
41. Id. at 493-96. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Brennan was unable to discern a
legitimate constitutional rationale for the majority's withdrawal of federal habeas
jurisdiction. Id. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He charged that the Court's "interest
balancing" analysis was a rhetorical veneer employed to obscure the fact that the
decision could not properly rest on constitutional grounds. Id.
The dissent further maintained that by "[e]mploying the transparent tactic
that today's is a decision construing the Constitution, the Court usurps the authority
- vested by the Constitution in the Congress - to reassign federal judicial
responsibility for reviewing state prisoners' claims of failure of state courts to redress
violations of their fourth amendment rights." Id. at 535 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The
dissent alleged that the actual basis of the Stone decision was the court's "novel
reinterpretation of the habeas statutes," which would require that district courts
"routinely" deny habeas relief to prisoners "in custody in violation of the Constitution
or laws . . . of the United States" as a matter of "judicially manufactured" judicial
discretion. Id. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Rejecting this
constitutional "interest balancing" approach as untenable, the dissent maintained
that the majority simply dressed its holding in "constitutional garb" in order to
disguise its rejection of the longstanding principle that there are no "second class"
constitutional rights for purposes of habeas corpus jurisdiction. Id. at 515 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
Justice Brennan also attacked the majority's construction of the functional
relationship between the exclusionary rule and the writ of habeas corpus. Id. at
512-13 n.10. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He argued that the "'costs' of applying the
exclusionary rule on habeas should alreadyhave been incurredat the trial or on direct
review if the state court had not misapplied federal constitutional principles." Id.
(emphasis in original). Since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), had established that
these costs were outweighed by the need to protect fourth amendment rights, "[tihe
only proper question on habeas is whether the federal courts . . . are to permit the
States free enjoyment of the fruits of a conviction which by definition were only
obtained through violations of the Constitution as interpreted in Mapp."428 U.S. at
512-13 n.10' (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Moreover, in the dissent's view, the majority opinion "portends substantial
evisceration of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction" in defiance of the congressional
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In an important footnote, the Stone majority rejected the view that
federal oversight of state court application of the exclusionary rule was
essential to effectuate fourth amendment values. 42 In fact, the rationale
supporting the Stone decision was premised on the Court's conviction that
the state courts could serve as "fair and competent forums for the
adjudication of federal constitutional rights," notwithstanding differences
in institutional environment between state and federal courts and irrespective of the lack of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional claims exhibited
43
by some state judges in the past.

The fundamental problem presented by the Stone decision is the
identification of those cases in which Stone's "opportunity" standard has
not been met, since the Court failed to provide specific guidelines for
determining what constitutes a "full and fair opportunity to litigate" a
fourth amendment claim in state court. 4" A close examination of the Stone
opinion, however, does afford lower courts some direction. In fact, three
aspects of the Stone decision support a "collateral estoppel" interpretation of
the "opportunity" test, under which actual litigation in state court would be
45
essential to preclude federal habeas review.
First, the majority's formulation of the "opportunity" test was
apparently derived from Justice Powell's concurring analysis in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,46 in which it was suggested that federal habeas review
of search and seizure claims should be limited "solely to the question of

mandate. Id. at 503 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See note 5 supra. In light of the

continued vitality of Mapp as the prevailing constitutional rule and the clear

congressional intent that federal courts exercising habeas review must stand ready
"to rectify any constitutional errors," the dissent argued that the Court's categoriza-

tion of constitutional rights and broad withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction

constituted an ominous usurpation of the legislative authority to prescribe a judicial
forum to redress violations of constitutional rights. 428 U.S. at 506, 529, 535 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). The dissent also found it "simply inconceivable that constitutional
deprivation suddenly vanishes after the [state] appellate process has been exhausted."
Id. at 511 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35.
43. Id. One recent commentator has expressed the view that Stone gives state
court adjudications of a class of federal constitutional claims "substantial immunity
from the exercise of federal habeas." Spritzer, supra note 24, at 501-02 (footnote
omitted). He noted that this immunity is contingent only upon the state courts having
followed adequate procedures. Id. at 502 n.146.
44. As a result this question has been left open for development on a case-by-case
basis, thus forcing lower courts to establish the appropriate criteria based on the
particular set of facts presented. See, e.g., Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221,
1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1977); United States ex rel. Conroy v.
Bombard, 426 F. Supp. 97, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
45. The rule of collateral estoppel provides that where an issue of fact or, in
limited circumstances, an issue of law "essential to the judgment is actually litigated
and determined by a valid and final judgment, the determination is conclusive
between the parties." Developments in the Law - Res Judicata,65 HARV. L. REV. 818,
840 (1952) (footnote omitted). The requirement that an issue actually be litigated in a
previous action is essential to the application of collateral estoppel to that issue when
it arises in subsequent litigation between the parties. Id. See Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
46. 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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whether the petitioner was provided a fair opportunity to raise and have
adjudicated the question in state courts. '47 Although it is unlikely that the
Stone majority unintentionally omitted the three words emphasized above
from its "opportunity" test, the Court's citation to Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Schneckloth suggests that actual consideration on the
merits in state court may constitute an implicit prerequisite to the
48
application of the "opportunity" test.

More persuasive support for this view may be inferred from the Stone
Court's citation to Townsend v. Sain.49 In Townsend, the Court held that a
federal evidentiary hearing must be afforded a state prisoner in federal court
on habeas corpus review if the habeas applicant did not receive a full and
fair evidentiary hearing in state court. 5° In an effort to establish the specific
standards governing the application of this general rule, the Townsend
Court prescribed the circumstances justifying the grant of an evidentiary
hearing in federal court:
1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state
hearing; 2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by
the record as a whole; 3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the
state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; 4) there
is a substantial allegation of newly discovered evidence; 5) the
material facts were not adequately developed at the state court hearing;
or 6) for any reason it appears that the state trier 5of fact did not afford
the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing. '
Under the first criterion of the Townsend standards, federal relitigation
of the facts underlying a constitutional claim is appropriate where the
merits of such a claim were not resolved by the state court.5 2 Perhaps the
Stone Court intended its reference to Townsend to permit the inclusion of the
standards enunciated therein within the ambit of the "opportunity" test.
47. Id. at 250 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis supplied).
48. See 428 U.S. at 480-81, citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
49. 372 U.S. 293 (1963). The question of the appropriate weight to be given to the
Stone Court's citation to Townsend is further complicated by the fact that the Court
referred to Townsend only in a footnote to the summary of its holding and preceded
its citation with a "cf." signal. See 428 U.S. at 494 n.36, citing Townsend v. Sain, 372
U.S. 293 (1963).
50. 372 U.S. at 312.
51. Id. at 313. These criteria are reflected in the 1966 amendments to § 2254 of
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970) yet the amendments are not "a direct statutory

codification of Townsend on the question when evidentiary hearings are mandatory."

Developments, supra note 1, at 1141. Instead the amendment assumes that a hearing
will be held and addresses the question of whether the state's factual conclusions
should be deemed presumptively correct at the federal hearing. Id. at 1122 n.46.
Notwithstanding their distinguishable purposes, the amendment and the Townsend
decision contain similar language and clearly reinforce each other. Some courts,

however, have gone further and treated the amendment as a codification of
Townsend. See, e.g., Maxwell v. Turner, 411 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1969); United
States ex rel. Hughes v. McMann, 405 F.2d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1968); White v. Swenson,
261 F. Supp. 42, 60 (W.D. Mo. 1966) (en banc).
52. See text accompanying note 51 supra:
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Finally, it would appear from the factual background of the Stone
decision that actual consideration on the merits of a fourth amendment
claim in state court is a prerequisite to the application of Stone's estoppel
rule, which forecloses federal habeas review when the "opportunity"
standard has been satisfied. 53 In each of the two cases consolidated for
review in Stone, the state courts had clearly addressed the merits of the
habeas petitioner's fourth amendment claim.54 It is submitted that the
consideration on the merits by the respective state courts made plausible the
Stone Court's assertion that state courts should be entrusted with the
55
primary responsibility for protection of fourth amendment rights.
The persuasiveness of these factors, particularly the applicability of the
Townsend criteria to Stone's procedural standard, has been greatly disputed
in the lower federal courts.56 Although most courts have rejected "a literal

53. The characterization of the Stone test as an estoppel rule is intended to
emphasize the conclusiveness of state court adjudications which comport with the
"opportunity" standard.
54. 428 U.S. at 470, 472. Petitioner Lloyd Powell, one of the state prisoners
seeking habeas relief in Stone, contended at trial that any testimony regarding the
search incident to his arrest and subsequent discovery of incriminating evidence
should be excluded because the vagrancy ordinance pursuant to which he was
detained was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 470-71. After the trial court rejected this
contention, Powell presented his argument to the state appellate court, which
concluded that any error in admitting testimony regarding the search and seizure was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 470. It was thus unnecessary to pass upon
the legality of the arrest and search. Id.. In granting habeas relief to Powell, the
Ninth Circuit held this ordinance unconstitutional under the vagueness standards
enunciated in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). Powell v.
Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Stone Court never
addressed this issue since it ruled that Powell had been afforded "a full and fair
opportunity to litigate" his claim in state court. 428 U.S. at 471 n.2, 481-82.

Petitioner David Rice, the other habeas litigant in Stone, filed a motion with
the trial court to suppress items seized in a search of his home pursuant to an
allegedly invalid search warrant. Id. at 472. After denial of his motion, Rice appealed
the issue to the state supreme court, which held that the search warrant was valid. Id.
See State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). Upon appeal the federal district
court disagreed, ruling the supporting affidavit defective under Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969), and Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Rice v. Wolff,
388 F. Supp. 185, 190-94 (D. Neb. 1974), aff'd, 513 F.2d 1280 (8th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub
nom. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
55. See 428 U.S. at 493-94 n.35. See also text accompanying notes 42 & 43 supra.
56. The Fifth Circuit has recognized "that Townsend is of some help in defining
'full and fair adjudication' by a state court." O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204,
1211 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). Two factors mentioned by the O'Berry
court, however, limited the usefulness of the Townsend criteria in the context of the
Stone test. First, the court pointed out that since Townsend technically applied only to
determinations of whether full and fair consideration of a fact issue has been afforded
by a state court, the Townsend test was not directly relevant where the issues in
dispute were legal only. 546 F.2d at 1211. Second, the O'Berry court cautioned that the
intended uses of the Townsend and Stone tests were clearly divergent. Id. In
Townsend, the question before the Court was the propriety of a rehearing in federal

court when facts were in dispute, not whether a federal court had jurisdiction to
consider the merits of a habeas petitioner's claim. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293,

312-13 (1963). The O'Berry court noted that in the situation present in Townsend the
Court's determination of whether the petitioner was afforded a full and fair hearing
on the relevant factual issues did not operate to deny the petitioner access to the
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engrafting" of Townsend as the sole measure of full and fair consideration
when legal questions are at issue,57 the Townsend criteria are generally
conceded to supply some guidance in deciding whether an adequate
opportunity to litigate has been provided in state court.58 For example, the
Townsend criteria suggest that a denial of federal habeas review must be
preceded by a resolution on the merits of the fourth amendment claim by a
state court,5 9 but do not address the underlying issue of the reason for the
failure or refusal of state courts to confront the merits of constitutional
claims. 60 An increasing number of federal courts, therefore, have been forced

federal forum. 546 F.2d at 1211. Rather, the effect of a finding that such a hearing had
been afforded was simply to require a federal court to accept the state court's findings
of fact while ruling on the petitioner's claim. Id. Contrarily, the practical effect of a
finding under Stone that a state prisoner had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
claim in state court was to preclude federal court adjudication of that claim. Id. at
1211-12. The O'Berry court was explicit with respect to this preclusive effect: "Despite
the assertions of the Supreme Court in Stone to the contrary, we would be blind to
reality to pretend that the practical effect of that decision is not a limitation on federal
court jurisdiction." Id. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1977) (decision does
not mean that a federal court 'lacks jurisdiction" over a fourth amendment claim).
Considering the two factors mentioned above, the O'Berry court concluded
that "it would be rash . . . to borrow wholesale the Townsend formula for use in the
Stone situation." 546 F.2d at 1212. The court did recognize, however, that the
Townsend criteria could "shed some light on the problem at hand." Id. The court then
looked to Stone for clues as to the meaning of its "opportunity" test. Id.
Consistent with this analysis, the Fifth Circuit also rejected Townsend as the
sole measure of Stone's "opportunity" test in a case presenting only questions of law.
Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1977). In Graves, the court was
confronted with a district court ruling that Stone did not block a petitioner's right to
federal court adjudication of his fourth amendment claim because the state court's
judgment concerning probable cause to arrest was not fairly supported by the record,
thus entitling petitioner to relief under the second criterion of the Townsend test. Id.
at 745-46. See text accompanying note 51 infra. The Graves court rejected application
of this Townsend criterion and refused to allow a federal court to overrule a state
court's resolution of the question of whether there was probable cause for a particular
search. 556 F.2d at 746. Reasoning that a finding of probable cause required a factual
determination supplemented by a legal conclusion, the Graves court refused to accord
the Townsend criterion controlling weight, and therefore refrained from reconsideration of the state court's probable cause determination. Id.
In a similar vein, a district court has concluded that the failure, at a state
suppression hearing, to adduce the material facts relative to a fourth amendment
claim and thereby qualify as a full and fair fact hearing under Townsend did not
indicate that the petitioner was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate under
Stone. See Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affl'd, 562
F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1977). According to the Pulver court, the opportunity to litigate
encompassed more than simply an ,evidentiary hearing in trial court; it also included
"that corrective action available through the appellate process on direct review of the
judgment of conviction." 419 F. Supp. at 1224. The Pulver court noted that the
adequacy of the appellate process was not addressed by the Townsend Court, and
therefore concluded that Townsend furnished only limited guidance for a court
seeking to define the scope of Stone's "opportunity" test. Id.
57. See Graves v. Estelle, 556 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
58. See note 55 supra.
59. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
60. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).
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to attempt to resolve this issue in deciding whether or not to apply Stone's
61
estoppel rule.

III.

FAILURE TO RAISE FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS DESPITE
AVAILABLE STATE PROCEDURES

The Stone Court did not specifically address the propriety of federal
habeas review where a state court failed to resolve the merits of a habeas
petitioner's fourth amendment claim. 62 A number of lower federal courts,
however, have construed the "opportunity" test to eliminate the federal
forum for vindication of fourth amendment rights notwithstanding the
failure of state courts to confront the merits of a habeas petitioner's fourth
amendment claim. 63 In O'Berry v. Wainwright,64 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the grant of habeas corpus relief
issued by a district court on the grounds that evidence obtained as a result of
an unconstitutional search of petitioner's automobile was introduced at
trial.65 The Fifth Circuit refused to consider the merits of the petitioner's
fourth amendment claim despite the fact that the claim was raised for the
first time in state court at the appellate level and was disposed of not on the
merits but, according to the O'Berry court, "on an independent, adequate,
'6
non-federal state ground.
Similarly, in Gates v. Henderson,67 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit dismissed a petition for habeas corpus filed by a state
prisoner who had failed to properly raise his fourth amendment claim in
state court as required by state law.68 These cases demonstrate that Stone is
susceptible to an interpretation which acquiesces in state imposed procedu6 9
ral bars to the vindication of fourth amendment rights.

61. See, e.g., Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.) cert.
denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
62. Whether this failure to reach the merits is a product of inadequate state
procedures or a defendant's procedural default has been held to be decisive under
Stone. Although the Stone Court did not directly confront the issue of procedural
default, subsequent decisions have viewed such default as dispositive of the question
whether a full and fair opportunity to litigate was afforded a defendant in state court.
See, e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911
(1977); Maxey v. Morris, 440 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Ill. 1977).
63. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 98
S. Ct.775 (1978); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 433 U.S.
911 (1977).
64. 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977). For a discussion of
O'Berry, see text accompanying notes 70-93 infra.
65. 546 F.2d at 1218.
66. Id. at 1216 (footnote omitted). The "nonfederal state ground" consisted of the
state appellate court's judgment that the petitioner had failed to raise his fourth
amendment claim by a "proper and timely" objection before the trial court, thereby
preserving the objection for appellate review. Id. See note 77 and accompanying text
infra.
67. 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 775 (1978).
68. 568 F.2d at 840. For a discussion of Gates, see notes 94-120 and accompanying text infra.
69. See Gibbons, Waiver: The Quest For Functional Limitations on Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction,2 SETON HALL L. REV. 291, 310 (1971).
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The O'Berry Decision

In O'Berry, a state prisoner sought federal habeas relief pursuant to a
fourth amendment claim despite his failure to raise that claim at trial and
7°
without having taken a direct appeal from his conviction in state court.
The petitioner raised his claim for the first time before the state appellate
court by means of a state habeas corpus petition. 71 The Florida District
Court of Appeal refused to address the merits of the petitioner's claim that
his fourth amendment rights had been violated by a warrantless search and
seizure of his automobile, reasoning that since the petitioner had failed to
raise a timely objection at trial to the introduction of the evidence derived
therefrom, in accordance with a state procedural rule 72 requiring contemporaneous objections to all but "fundamental error," he did not properly
73
preserve his objection for appellate review.
Petitioner thereafter filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, alleging a
violation of his fourth amendment right to remain free from an unreasonable search and seizure and his sixth amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. 74 The district court found no violation of petitioner's sixth
amendment rights but determined that he was entitled to be released or to
have a retrial within a reasonable time because his fourth amendment
rights had been abridged. 75 On appeal by the state, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court and held that a

70. 546 F.2d at 1207. O'Berry was convicted in state court on two counts of rape.
Id. at 1207. At trial, his court appointed counsel did not object to testimony by a
detective that defendant's automobile, searched without a warrant approximately 36
hours after the rape, had recently been wiped clean of fingerprints. Id. Petitioner's
trial counsel unilaterally made the decision not to appeal, and the petitioner was not
advised of his counsel's failure to file an appeal. Id. n.6. Years later, pursuant to state
post-conviction remedy procedures, petitioner raised the objection that his fourth
amendment rights had been violated when evidence of the allegedly illegal search and
seizure of his automobile was admitted into evidence at trial. Id. at 1207-08. After an
evidentiary hearing held in the Florida District Court of Appeal, this claim was
rejected largely on the grounds that petitioner's contentions were not properly
preserved for appellate review. O'Berry v. Wainwright, 300 So. 2d 740 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974). See note 80 infra. After thus exhausting his state remedies, petitioner filed
a habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida. 546 F.2d at 1209.
71. 546 F.2d at 1207. Petitioner was granted a belated state habeas review of his

conviction on the grounds that his court appointed trial counsel's unilateral decision

not to appeal the conviction constituted state action sufficient to frustrate petitioner's
right to appeal. Id. n.6.
72. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190 (h)(H). See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 300 So. 2d 740 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Simpson v. State, 211 So. 2d 862 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (where
no fundamental error exists, defendant must make timely objection to the introduction of evidence in order to preserve his objection for appellate review). In State v.
Smith, 240 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1970), the Supreme Court of Florida defined the
fundamental error rule of the Florida courts as "error which goes to the foundation of
the case or goes to the merits of the cause of action." Id. at 810, quoting Sanford v.
Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970).
73. 546 F.2d at 1209.
74. Id.
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federal court was precluded by the Stone decision from considering the
merits of the petitioner's fourth amendment claims on federal habeas
corpus.7 6 The court concluded that Stone's "opportunity" test was satisfied
"where the state court is squarely faced with Petitioner's Fourth Amendment claim, but chooses to resolve that claim on an independent, adequate,
non-federal state ground, at least where that state ground does not unduly
' 77
burden federal rights.

75. Id. at 1218. The court rejected "the out of hand" contention that Stone should
be given only prospective effect. Id. n.23. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.38
(1976).
76. 546 F.2d at 1217-18. Significantly, the O'Berry court did not read Stone as
requiring that a fourth amendment claim actually be considered at every level of the
state court system in order to satisfy the "full and fair" element of Stone's
"opportunity" test. Id. at 1213. The court distinguished between those situations in
which facts remained in dispute and those in which only legal questions were
presented. Id. The majority justified this distinction on the grounds that the Stone
opinion contained ambiguous references to review by both state trial and appellate
courts, while at other times state review was described only in very general terms. Id.
at 1212-13. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489, 490, 493, 494 n.37 (1976). The
argument that Stone required two tiers of state court review in order to check the
arbitrary exercise of power by a single state court judge was rejected. 546 F.2d at 1213
n.13.
The O'Berry majority nevertheless recognized that full and fair review of
fourth amendment claims involving disputed facts normally required both consideration of those claims by the fact finding court and access to "meaningful appellate
review" by higher state courts. Id. at 1213. In contrast, in those cases presenting an
undisputed factual background, such as O'Berry's, the full and fair consideration
requirement was found to be fully satisfied when only a state appellate court
addressed a petitioner's fourth amendment claims, even though no new evidentiary
hearing was held. Id. According to the majority, this distinction "makes practical
sense because it ensures that a criminal defendant is given a full hearing on his
Fourth Amendment claims and the facts underlying those claims at least once at the
state level, but it does not require the State to hold evidentiary hearings which would
be useless and inefficient." Id.
77. 546 F.2d at 1216-17 (footnotes omitted). The "independent, adequate, nonfederal state ground" in this case was the failure to comply with Florida's
"contemporaneous objection" requirement applicable to evidentiary rulings during
trial. Id. at 1217. See note 72 supra.See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976)
(habeas relief denied where petitioner failed to make timely challenge to allegedly
unconstitutional grand jury indictment); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965)
(remanded to state court to establish whether petitioner's failure to raise his federal
claims in accordance with the contemporaneous objection rule constituted a knowing
waiver); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (habeas relief granted since failure to appeal
found not to be failure to exhaust available state remedies under the circumstances).
The Fifth Circuit did not specify in what circumstances the state grounds for
decision may "unduly" burden federal rights. By way of comparison, however, the
court cited NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), in which the Supreme Court held
that "[n]ovelty in procedural requirements cannot be permitted to thwart review in
this court applied for by those who, in justified reliance upon prior decisions, seek
vindication in state courts of their federal constitutional rights." 546 F.2d at 1217
n.18, citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 457-58 (1958).
In light of the O'Berry court's recognition of the Supreme Court's admonition
in NAACP, it is difficult to see why the O'Berry court allowed enforcement of
Florida's contemporaneous objection rule to "thwart" federal habeas review. Since the
O'Berry court refused to address the merits of the habeas petitioner's fourth
amendment claims, it is submitted that the state rule was permitted to "unduly
burden" federal rights by denying the petitioner access to any forum to hear his
claims. See notes 227-31 and accompanying text infra.
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The O'Berry court found that the state appellate court had been
"squarely faced" with petitioner's fourth amendment claims.78 The court
stated that the petitioner had taken full advantage of this opportunity to set
forth the facts and law supporting his fourth amendment claims,7 9 and
rejected the petitioner's argument that the full and fair consideration
requirement established by Stone was not satisfied where the state court
disposed of these claims not on the merits but on due process considerations
concerning the fairness of the trial.80 The Fifth Circuit declined to review the
state court decision, finding that the state procedural rule requiring
contemporaneous objections to evidentiary rulings served a legitimate state
interest and therefore qualified as an adequate and independent state
ground of decision."1 The O'Berry court held that the state court's resolution

78. 546 F.2d at 1213.
79. Id. at 1217.
80. Id. at 1210. The Fifth Circuit noted that the state appellate court had placed
"particular significance" on the fact that
none of the critical contentions of the petitioner were brought before the trial
court by a proper and timely objection; consequently, they have not been
preserved for appellate review .... Except where fundamental error is involved,
and we find none to exist here[,] it is essential that a defendant properly and
timely object to the introduction of evidence in order to preserve his objection for
appellate review.
Id. at 1209 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 1218. Citing the Supreme Court's analysis of the state contemporaneous
objection rule involved in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), the majority
adopted the following appraisal of the state interest supporting the procedural rule
enforced by the O'Berry decision: "By immediately apprising the trial judge of the
objection, counsel gives the court the opportunity to conduct the trial without using
the tainted evidence. If the objection is well taken the fruits of the illegal search may
be excluded from jury consideration, and a reversal and new trial avoided." 546 F.2d
at 1218, quoting Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 448 (1965). Significantly, the
majority did not read Stone as overruling Henry's formulation of the adequate state
ground theory. 546 F.2d at 1217.
In Henry, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that federal courts "will
decline to review [on appeal] state court judgments which rest on independent and
adequate state grounds, even where these judgments also decide federal questions."
379 U.S. at 446. The Court disposed of this case, which reached the Supreme Court not
by habeas corpus but upon the grant of certiorari, by remanding to the state court for
a determination of whether counsel's noncompliance with the trial court's contemporaneous objection rule constituted a deliberate bypass of state procedures and
therefore a waiver. Id. at 450-53. For a discussion of the waiver rule and Henry v.
Mississippi, see Developments, supra note 1, at 1106-12. See also Fay v. Noia, 372
U.S. 391, 399 (1963) (failure to appeal need not be intelligent and understanding
waiver of right to appeal).
Despite the O'Berry court's reliance on Henry, it is submitted that the
independent state ground theory is inappropriate to the question of the proper exercise
of federal habeas review The Henry Court recognized that a litigant's procedural
default in state proceedings does not preclude vindication of his federal rights "unless
the State's insistence on compliance with its procedural rule serves a legitimate state
interest." 379 U.S. at 447. A procedural forfeiture should therefore only be allowed to
bar vindication of federal rights when a strong state interest would be served. Id. No
showing of such a state interest was advanced in support of the contemporaneous
objection rule involved in O'Berry. Moreover, the O'Berry court ignored the fact that
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), held that the doctrine that the federal courts will not
review state court judgments which rest on independent and adequate state grounds
was not applicable in federal collateral proceedings. Id. at 399. Reflecting this
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of the fourth amendment claims satisfied Stone's full and fair consideration
requirement, notwithstanding the absence of an adjudication of those claims
82
on the merits.
In reaching this result, the Fifth Circuit asserted that its reasoning and
conclusions were entirely consistent with Stone.8 3 The court noted that the
state court's resolution of a fourth amendment claim on an "adequate,
independent, non-federal" state ground did not merit review on federal
habeas corpus under Stone since this resolution: 1) was "perfectly consistent" with Stone's requirement that an opportunity be given for full and
fair litigation in state court; 2) reinforced Stone's fundamental premise that
the costs of the exclusionary rule often outweigh its benefits; and 3)
furthered Stone's policy of permitting state courts to serve as final arbiters
of federal constitutional rights. 84
Judge Goldberg filed a vigorous dissent in O'Berry,8 5 stating that the
majority decision effectively overruled the Supreme Court's decision in Fay
v. Noia,8 6 at least insofar as that decision applied to fourth amendment
claims."7 In Fay, the Supreme Court held that the independent state
procedural ground doctrine did not automatically bar review of a state
prisoner's claims on federal habeas corpus.88 Noting that the Stone decision
did not clearly evince an intention to overrule Fay, the dissent argued that
criticism of the majority's use of the Henry standards, the dissent in O'Berry
contended that the court's discussion of Henry "unfortunately serves only to signify
the degree to which it has missed the importance of Fay." 546 F.2d at 1222 (Goldberg,
J., dissenting) See notes 85-93 and accompanying text infra.
Although the Stone Court did not purport to address this question, the
O'Berry court inexplicably relied on Henry as authority for its injection of the
adequate state grounds theory into Stone's "opportunity" test. 546 F.2d at 1216 n.17.
The fact is that Henry dealt with the implications of waiver, while Stone was limited
to consideration of the preclusive consequences of actually raising constitutional
claims in state court. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1076. Consequently, the

O'Berry court's finding that the state contemporaneous objection rule served a
legitimate state interest should not have been considered dispositive of the question of
whether Stone's "opportunity" test was satisfied. See 546 F.2d at 1217. Stone did not
advance the novel theory that a particular state's interest in enforcement of its
procedural rules is relevant to the proper limits of federal habeas jurisdiction,
particularly where the availability of any judicial forum prepared to resolve a
constitutional claim on its merits is brought into question.
It should be noted that the waiver approach has been recently adopted by the
Supreme Court in the context of due process claims raised on habeas corpus. See
Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
Moreover, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Court finally directly
limited the scope of Fay by holding that a defendant failing to comply with a state's

contemporaneous objection rule bears the burden of showing "cause" and "prejudice"
in order to raise a fifth amendment claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Id. at

77-91. See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1072-102. Unlike Stone,
those cases dealt with the consequences of the failure to raise federal constitutional
claims at the proper time in state proceedings. Id. at 1076.
82. 546 F.2d at 1218.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1216-17 (emphasis supplied by court).
85. Id. at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
86. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
87. 546 F.2d at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
88. 372 U.S. at 434.
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Stone, in which a state court had disposed of the petitioner's fourth
amendment claims on the merits, only closed the federal forum for
redetermination of the merits of such a claim.8 9
In contrast, the O'Berry decision precluded the petitioner from
presenting the merits of his federal claim before any forum 0 Since Fay had
earlier established that such a severe sanction was appropriate only when a
petitioner had deliberately bypassed state procedures, 9 1 the dissent chose to
interpret Stone as consistent with Fay by reading the "opportunity" test to
imply that "noncompliance with state procedural rules will preclude
consideration of a fourth amendment claim on the merits in federal habeas
proceedings only if that noncompliance was the product of a deliberate,
knowing decision of defendant and his counsel." 92 The dissent concluded
that Stone was not directly applicable because the Court in that case "was

89. 546 F.2d at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1220 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
91. See 372 U.S. at 434-35. The Fay Court held that: 1) the adequate state
ground theory "is not to be extended to limit the power granted the federal courts
under the federal habeas statute"; 2) the exhaustion requirement applies only to
remedies still available when the petitioner applies for habeas relief; and 3) the
petitioner's waiver of his right to appeal was not "intelligent and understanding"
because of the risk that a successful state appeal would result in a retrial in which the
death penalty might be imposed. Id. at 398-400. See Note, FederalHabeas Corpus for
State Prisoners: The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 78, 83 (1964).
Professor Cover observed that the Fay decision serves to guarantee
"independent federal adjudications free from the impact of structural deficiencies in
state criminal processes" in three ways. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1042.
First, Fay "reaffirmed the doctrine of Brown v. Allen that state court adjudications
could not estop federal court adjudication." Id. (footnote omitted). Second, it states
that defendants could not forfeit their opportunity to raise federal claims in federal
courts unless they had "deliberately bypassed" available state procedures. Id. See 372
U.S. at 438-40. Third, the presence of this waiver depends upon "the considered
choice" of the defendant, not the acts of his counsel. Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note
36, at 1042. See 372 U.S. at 439.
92. 546 F.2d at 1221 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). Judge Goldberg did not find the
Stone Court's refusal to label the exclusionary rule a "personal constitutional right"
sufficient to explain the circumstances in which federal habeas review should remain
unavailable. Id. See generally Monaghan, The Supreme Court 1974 Term, Foreword:
ConstitutionalCommon Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1975). Judge Goldberg contended
that federal courts should not be allowed to refuse to apply the exclusionary rule
remedy left intact by Stone simply through strict enforcement of state procedural
rules. 546 F.2d at 1221 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
It should be noted that the dissent in O'Berry specifically declined to endorse
the view that a determination on the merits in state court was always a prerequisite to
application of Stone. Id. at 1219-20 n.1 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). As support for this
position, the dissent emphasized the significance of the use of the term "opportunity"
by the Stone Court. Id. The dissent argued, however, that in light of the continued
existence, if not vitality, of the exclusionary rule, it was consistent with the Stone
Court's deterrence analysis for the federal courts to consider the merits of fourth
amendment claims where states have not. Id. at 1221-22 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
Specifically, the dissent stated that federal habeas review in these circumstances
"effectuates the Stone conclusion that this society shall maintain that 'visible
expression' [of social disapproval for the violation of the guarantees of the fourth
amendment] and provide at least one level of enforcement of the exclusionary rule."
Id. at 1222 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See generally Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHi. L. REv. 665, 709-11 (1970).
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not faced with, and did not allude to, the problem of determining whether or
when a state's withdrawal of that opportunity because of a procedural error
would forfeit the right to federal collateral relief." 93
B. The Gates Decision
The O'Berry opinion is not the only recent decision to apply Stone in
derogation of a fourth amendment claimant's opportunity to be heard on the
merits. Faced with a comparable factual setting in Gates v. Henderson,94 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on a fourth amendment claim
while espousing an interpretation of Stone similar to that set forth by the
95
Fifth Circuit in O'Berry.
Petitioner Gates had been convicted of first-degree murder in state court
primarily because his fingerprints and palmprints matched those found at
the murder scene. 96 After his direct and collateral appeals in the state courts
were unsuccessful, 97 Gates filed a federal habeas corpus petition alleging
that the lack of probable cause for his arrest rendered the taking of his
prints violative of the fourth amendment. 98 Gates, however, had failed to
raise this objection prior to or during his trial, as required by state statute. 99
In light of this procedural default, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York dismissed the petition.1°°
On appeal, the Second Circuit, reversed the district court in the wake of
the Supreme Court's decision in Stone, remanding the petition to the district
court for an evidentiary hearing on the merits. 01 The court concluded that

93. 546 F.2d at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
94. 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en bane), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978).
95. 568 F.2d at 840. Compare the Gates court's analysis of Stone with that

employed by the O'Berry court. See notes 70-84 and accompanying text supra; notes
96-116 and accompanying text infra.
96. 568 F.2d at 832.
97. Id. Gates' conviction was affirmed by two state courts of appeals. Id. The
Court of Appeals of New York held that the defendant's failure to object to fingerprint
evidence on the grounds that it was the fruit of an arrest without probable cause did
not permit that objection to be cognizable on appeal. People v. Gates, 24 N.Y.2d 666,
670, 249 N.E.2d 450, 452, 301 N.Y.S.2d 597, 601 (1969).
98. Gates v. Henderson, Civ. No. 73-3865 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976). See Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints taken during illegal detention held to be
improperly admitted into evidence).
99. In response to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), New York law provided for a
statutory mechanism for the suppression of evidence obtained through an unlawful
search or seizure in violation of the defendant's fourth amendment rights. See N.Y.
CRIM. Paoc. LAw § 710.20 (McKinney 1971).
100. Gates v. Henderson, Civ. No. 73-3865, slip op. at 7-8 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976).
The district court noted that "[tihe [state] Court of Appeals was merely enforcing
procedural requirements under New York law and chose to follow its policy of
ignoring claims judged not to have been adequately raised below." Id.
Under the New York procedure, a motion to suppress is normally made prior
to trial but it "may be made during trial where the defendant was unaware of the
seizure or did not have either material evidence or the opportunity to make a pretrial
motion." 568 F.2d at 837.
101. 568 F.2d at 832.
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Gates had not been afforded an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his
fourth amendment objection because his objection had never been consi10 2
dered on the merits by the state courts.
Seven months later, the Second Circuit granted a motion for a rehearing
en banc of the Gates case, 10 3 and thereupon reversed itself, holding that the
petitioner's failure to assert his fourth amendment challenge in accordance
with the procedural devices afforded by the state precluded consideration of
his claim on federal habeas corpus review under Stone. 04 Finding that the
state statutory mechanisms relating to suppression of evidence provided a
full and fair opportunity to litigate Gates' claim, 10 5 the court refused to
accept the argument that the absence of consideration on the merits in state
court was dispositive of Stone's "opportunity" test. 10 6 The Second Circuit
applied the "opportunity" test literally, focusing strictly on the corrective
procedures available in the state court system. 0 7 Noting that those
procedures were clearly available in the case at bar, the court stated that
the Stone decision established that "we have no authority to review the state
record and grant the writ simply because we disagree with the result reached
by the state courts."' 08 Accordingly, the court dismissed the habeas
petition. 09
102. Id. at 851. The court relied on the second Townsend category in its analysis.
Id. at 849. See text accompanying note 51 supra. That category under Townsend is
one in which "for any reason not attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner
* . .evidence crucial to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not
developed at the state hearing." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (citation
omitted). See also Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). The Second Circuit found that
the evidence relating to the circumstances surrounding Gates' arrest had not been
developed at all in state court. 568 F.2d at 849. After reviewing the record and

concluding that the petitioner's failure to timely raise his constitutional objection did

not constitute "inexcusable neglect," the majority ruled that the state court's failure to
develop evidence crucial to petitioner's claim in accordance with Townsend deprived
him of a state opportunity to fully and fairly litigate it. Id. at 851. The court also
determined that Townsend's first criterion had not been satisfied. Id. at 848-49. See
note 106 infra. For a discussion of the relationship between the Townsend criteria and
the Stone test, see note 56 supra.
103. 568 F.2d at 832.
104. Id. at 840.
105. Id. at 837-38.
106. Id. at 837. The panel majority which delivered the Second Circuit's first

opinion in Gates determined that federal habeas review was appropriate under the
first criterion of the Townsend standards because the merits of the factual dispute
were not resolved in state court. Id. at 848-49, 851. In response to this argument, the
en banc Gates court pointed out that Townsend mandated a federal hearing where the
state court failed to actually consider and decide issues of fact "tendered by the
defendant." Id. at 838, quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313-14 (1963)
(emphasis by the court). Since Gates never raised the issue of probable cause for his
arrest in the state forum, the court concluded that Townsend did not mandate a
hearing in federal court. 568 F.2d at 838.
107. 568 F.2d at 836-37. The court noted that the petitioner did not even attempt to

argue that the state procedural devices available to raise the issue of an unlawful
arrest were deficient. Id. at 837.
108. Id. at 840. The majority opinion nevertheless did not intimate that the court
would have granted habeas relief if in fact it were allowed to address the merits of the
fourth amendment claim.
109. Id.
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As in O'Berry, the Gates court arrived at this resolution of Stone's
ambiguous standard without reliance on two Supreme Court cases normally
considered relevant by federal habeas courts. The court viewed the
Townsend criteria 110 as irrelevant since Gates never actually sought an
evidentiary hearing.l Furthermore, the Gates court rejected the contention
that the Fay decision withdrew the power of federal courts to deny
consideration of a habeas claim on the merits absent a finding of a
deliberate bypass or knowing waiver of state procedures.' 12 Reading Stone
"as effectively overruling Fay with respect to Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule claims,"" 3 the court emphasized that Stone "did not further
indicate that [the] opportunity [for full and fair litigation of a fourth
amendment claim], if not exercised in the state court, was only lost when the
defendant or his counsel deliberately and intentionally sought to by-pass the
114
state process."
The Gates court did acknowledge that Stone allowed federal habeas
review of fourth amendment claims in situations where a state fails to

110. See text accompanying note 51 supra.

111. 568 F.2d at 837. The majority acknowledged that "[h]ad Gates requested and
been given a hearing but it was deficient, an issue under the Townsend criteria might

possibly surface." Id. Admitting that it was not "fully appreciative" of the
significance of the footnoted reference to Townsend in the Stone opinion, the court
was persuaded that this citation "cannot be reasonably interpreted to require a
federal court to conduct a hearing on an issue where the state prisoner, having an
opportunity to do so, never tendered the question to the state court." Id. at 838. In the
Gates court's view, this would "totally undercut the thrust and rationale of Stone." Id.
112. Id. 838-39.
113. Id. at 838 (footnote omitted). The court emphasized that Stone had rejected the
premise that the exclusionary rule was a "constitutional ingredient" of the fourth
amendment. Id. at 839. Hence, Fay's presumption that plenary federal review was
always available to redress constitutional wrongs had been destroyed with respect to
search and seizure claims. Id. Cf. O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1219 (5th
Cir.) (Goldberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977) (Stone Court did not
clearly indicate an intention to overrule Fay as far as fourth amendment rights were
concerned).
The concurring opinion in Gates, however, argued that Stone did not overrule
Fay with respect to the deliberate bypass standard because the Stone opinion
contained, in the summary of its holding, a crucial citation to Townsend, which in
turn contained a citation to Fay. 568 F.2d at 842 (Oakes, J., concurring). But see
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-88 (1977) (rejecting the "sweeping language" of

Fay).
114. 568 F.2d at 839. Judge Mulligan's majority opinion thus refrained from any
attempt to reconcile Fay and Stone. On the contrary, the majority maintained that
"[h]ad the Court intended to so drastically qualify its rule [by subjecting it to Fay's
deliberate bypass standard], it certainly would have so stated." Id. The majority
therefore found the kind of inquiry mandated by Fay to be inappropriate in the

context of Stone analysis:
Requiring the federal court to make collateral investigations of the subjective
motivation of the state prisoner which would involve the expenditure of sorely
pressed federal judicial resources and exacerbate possible friction between the
federal and state judiciary, is antithetical to the very factors which motivated the
Stone majority to sharply limit the role of the federal court in Fourth
Amendment state habeas procedures.

Id. (footnote omitted).
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provide any corrective procedures at all sufficient to redress fourth
amendment violations, 115 or where a defendant is precluded from utilizing
the state corrective process because of an "unconscionable breakdown" in
that process. 116

The concurring opinion in Gates, written by Judge Oakes, objected to
117
the majority's formulation of a stringent "opportunity" test under Stone.
Judge Oakes argued that the Stone Court's use of general language
demonstrated that each case should be examined on its particular facts in
order to determine whether the "opportunity" test was satisfied. 18 The
concurrence also noted that the majority's view that federal habeas review
of a fourth amendment claim was warranted in only two situations
constituted a shortsighted view of Stone. 1 9 Consistent with the approach
taken by most federal courts faced with fourth amendment claims after
Stone, Judge Oakes maintained that the inquiry should focus upon whether
"in the individual case, the state courts had in fact meaningfully considered
20
the defendant's claim.'
C. Analysis of O'Berry and Gates
In both O'Berry and Gates, the majority opinions interpreted Stone to
require that access to federal habeas court be closed to a habeas petitioner
who was deficient in presenting his fourth amendment claim in state

115. Id. at 840.
116. Id. See generally Bator, supra note 3, at 456-57.
117. 568 F.2d at 843 (Oakes, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 843-44 (Oakes, J., concurring). Judge Oakes reasoned that the inclusion
of the term "fair" as an element of Stone's "opportunity" test implied a case-by-case
approach consistent with the exercise of equitable discretion. Id. at 844 (Oakes, J.,
concurring).
119. Id. at 843 (Oakes, J., concurring).

120. Id. at 844 (Oakes, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Judge Oakes cited
numerous cases in support of this proposition. Id. at 844 n.8 (Oakes, J., concurring).
See e.g., O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1215-16 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 911 (1977) (state appellate court "squarely faced" with fourth amendment claim
but resolved that claim on nonfederal state grounds); Bracco v. Reed, 540 F.2d 1019,
1020 (9th Cir. 1976) (petitioner denied habeas relief where he had been given
opportunity to present constitutional claim in state court and was only objecting to
the state court disposition of that claim); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500, 502 (10th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (state court reviewed suppression hearing transcript and found
hearing full and adequate); George v. Blackwell, 537 F.2d 833, 834 (5th Cir. 1976) (per
curiam) (state court hearing on fourth amendment claim held to be full and fair);
Losinno v. Henderson, 420 F. Supp. 380, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (careful consideration of
petitioner's state court treatment); Pulver v. Cunningham, 419 F. Supp. 1221, 1224
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 562 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1977) (focus on corrective action available
through appellate process on direct review of conviction). Cf. United States ex rel.
Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686, 688-89 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 903 (3d
Cir. 1977) (state procedures available to rectify fourth amendment claims deficient
and thus no adequate opportunity).
Other courts, however, have applied a less stringent standard and found the
"opportunity" test satisfied if the state courts considered the fourth amendment claim
at all. See, e.g., Cole v. Estelle, 548 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1977); Corley v. Cardwell, 544
F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977); Roach v. Paratt, 541 F.2d

772 (8th Cir. 1976).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss5/4

22

Ossola: The Opportunity Test of Stone v. Powell: Toward a Redefinition of
1977-19781

COMMENT

1117

court.121 In effect, these decisions have established that a state court that
refuses to adjudicate a fourth amendment claim because of a defendant's
noncompliance with a state procedural rule, irrespective of whether that
122
noncompliance was occasioned by a deliberate bypass or knowing waiver,
may be said to have afforded the defendant a full and fair opportunity to
litigate such claim in state court, compelling withdrawal of federal habeas
consideration under Stone. 23 In contrast, the dissent in O'Berry argued that
the Stone decision operated only to eliminate the federal habeas forum to
individuals who had actually exercised their opportunity to litigate fourth
amendment claims in a state forum. 2 4 The concurrence in Gates suggested
that the language of Stone's "opportunity" test required federal courts to
avoid rigid rules and to determine whether the state courts had in fact
"meaningfully considered" the defendant's claim. 25
The O'Berry decision appears to have established that a state court
decision on the merits of a fourth amendment claim is not a prerequisite to
application of the Stone rule.126 Federal courts following O'Berry are
apparently free to reject habeas appeals filed by state prisoners alleging
fourth amendment violations where those prisoners have failed to adhere to
state procedures regarding the proper time to raise objections to these
violations. Procedural defaults may thus have a preclusive effect on the

availability of a federal forum to protect substantive constitutional rights.
That this result is consistent with the procedural nature of Stone's
"opportunity" test cannot be denied; 127 the language of the Stone test 128 does

suggest that a state court determination on the merits is not a necessary
precondition to application of Stone's estoppel rule. However, since
protection of the innocent is the paramount purpose of federal habeas corpus
review, 129 it is submitted that a state court determination on the merits is an
appropriate prerequisite to any application of Stone, absent a knowing
waiver by a habeas applicant,'30 particularly in light of the congressional
121. See text accompanying notes 70-120 supra.
122. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), in which the Court determined that a
federal district court might deny federal habeas relief only where a petitioner had
deliberately bypassed or knowingly waived his right to raise a federal constitutional
claim in the state courts. Id. at 438. But see Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977)
("cause and prejudice" standard supplants the "deliberate bypass" test with respect to
certain constitutional claims). See notes 132-48 and accompanying text infra.
123. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1219 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
124. 546 F.2d at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
125. See 568 F.2d at 844 (Oakes, J., concurring).
126. See 546 F.2d at 1216-17.
127. The test is procedural in the sense that it requires only that an "opportunity"
for full and fair litigation be required, not that the litigation in state court actually be
full and fair. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
128. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
129. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976). Justice Brennan,
however, rejected the idea that constitutionally mandated procedures are not always
applicable to non-"guilt-related" constitutional claims. Id. at 523 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). For an excellant analysis of the implications of the Stone court's
guilt/innocence distinction, see Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1086-100.
130. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). See also note 135 supra.
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intent that habeas corpus review serve as the "primary federal remedy for
31
errors and deficiencies in the criminal process."'
It is arguable, though, that the O'Berry court's construction of Stone
was reinforced by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Wainwright v.
Sykes.' 31 In Wainwright, the defendant, convicted of murder in a Florida
state court, asserted a fifth amendment claim133 based upon the admission
into evidence of his confession, allegedly made without full understanding of
the Miranda warnings. 3 4 The defendant, having failed to raise this
objection either at trial, as required by Florida's contemporaneous objection
rule, 35 or upon direct appeal of his conviction, 136 sought federal habeas
137
corpus review.
Upon review of the lower federal court's order that the State of Florida
hold a hearing to determine whether Sykes knowingly waived his Miranda
rights, 138 the Supreme Court reversed and dismissed Sykes' habeas corpus
petition. 139 Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, 40 reaffirmed the
131. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1087. See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970).
Justice Brennan maintained in Stone that "[flederal courts have the duty to carry out
the congressionally assigned responsibility to shoulder the ultimate burden of
adjudging whether detentions violate federal law." 428 U.S. at 525-26 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
132. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
133. The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent
part that "[n]o person shall be ...

deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due

process of law nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.

134. 433 U.S. at 74-75. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda
the Court established that a defendant's statements stemming from custodial
interrogation were admissible at trial only if certain procedural safeguards were
employed to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444. Specifically, the
Court determined that prior to any questioning, a person must be warned that he has
a right to remain silent, that any statement he makes may be used against him, and
that he has the right to the presence of an attorney. Id.
135. Rule 3.190(i)(2) of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in
pertinent part, that a motion to suppress a confession "shall be made prior to trial
unless opportunity therefor did not exist or the defendant was not aware of the
grounds for the motion, but the court in its discretion may entertain the motion of an
appropriate objection at the trial." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.190(i)(2) (1972).

136. 433 U.S. at 75. After Sykes' direct appeal of his conviction was rejected, he
filed in the trial court a motion to vacate the conviction and he also filed appropriate
state petitions for habeas corpus: Id. He was unsuccessful in each of these efforts. Id.
137. Id.

138. Id. at 75-76. The district court ruled that the state court should hold a hearing
on the "voluntariness" of Sykes' inculpatory statement, as required by Jackson v.
Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). 433 U.S. at 75-76. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
concluding that the failure to comply with the contemporaneous objection rule would
only bar federal habeas review of the suppression claim "where the right to object was
deliberately bypassed for reasons relating to trial tactics," a condition that did not
apply to this case. Id. at 76-77. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 528 F.2d 522 (5th Cir. 1976),
rev'd, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
139. 433 U.S. at 91.
140. Justice Rehnquist's opinion was joined by Justices Blackmun, Powell, Stevens
and Stewart, and by Chief Justice Burger. Justice White concurred in the judgment
because he believed the facts warranted a conclusion of harmless error. Id. at 97-99

(White, J., concurring). Justice Stevens concurred, concluding that Sykes' trial counsel

"could well have made a deliberate decision not to object to the admission of the
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values embraced by the Court in Stone141 while confronting the question,
previously addressed by the Fifth Circuit in O'Berry in the context of fourth
amendment claims, of when an adequate and independent state ground
barred consideration of otherwise cognizable federal issues on federal
habeas review. 14 2 Maintaining that a contemporaneous objection rule
imposed by a "coordinate jurisdiction" deserves "greater respect than Fay
gives it,"'14 3 the majority emphasized the rule's contribution to finality in
criminal litigation and its utility in making the state trial the "main event"
144
rather than a "tryout on the road" to an eventual federal habeas hearing.
The majority held that the rule barring federal habeas review absent a
showing of "cause" for a procedural default, explaining why it occurred, and
"prejudice" resulting therefrom, 4 5 should be applied to a "waived objection"

defendant's in custody statement." Id. at 96 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Burger also concurred but argued in addition that Fay's "deliberate bypass" standard
was inapplicable to errors alleged to have been committed during trial. Id. at 91-92
(Burger,InC. aJ.,
concurring).
forceful
dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, examined
the meaning and import of procedural default in the context of the availability of
federal habeas relief. Id. at 101-05 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued
persuasively that the treatment of
simple mistakes of attorneys .

.

. as binding forfeitures .

.

. would serve to

subordinate the fundamental rights contained in our constitutional charter to
inadvertent defaults of rules promulgated by state agencies, and would
essentially leave it to the States, through the enactment of procedure and the
certification of the competence of local attorneys, to determine whether a habeas
applicant will be permitted the access to the federal forum that is guaranteed
him by Congress.

Id. at 107 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).

141. These values include the interests of comity and federalism and the
encouragement of efficiency and finality in criminal proceedings. Id. at 81-90. See
Spritzer, supra note 24, at 506. See also Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
142. 433 U.S. at 78-79.
143. Id. at 88.
144. Id. at 90. The majority also pointed out that the rule allowed decisions on
constitutional claims to be made when the recollections of witnesses are freshest and
by the judge who observed the demeanor of those witnesses. Id. at 88.
145. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976). In Francis,the Court held that
a collateral attack upon an allegedly unconstitutional composition of an indicting
grand jury required "not only a showing of 'cause' for the defendant's failure to
challenge the composition of the grand jury before trial, but also a showing of actual
prejudice." Id. at 542 (footnote omitted).
The cause and prejudice standard was first articulated in the context of a
federal prisoner's challengb on habeas corpus of the composition of the grand jury
which indicted him. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1963). Relying on previous
constructions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(bX2), the Davis Court ruled
that no "cause" for relief had been shown in light of the facts, inter alia, that the
same method of grand jury selection had been used for a number of years, that racial
discrimination was not present, that the prosecution had presented a convincing case,
and that the habeas challenge was initiated three years after the petitioner's
conviction. Id. at 235-36, 243-44.
The prejudice requirement may necessitate a showing that the alleged
constitutional defect influenced the ultimate decision regarding guilt or innocence. See
Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1076 n.192. Apparently the Wainwright Court

believed that the prejudice standard would not prevent a habeas court from correcting

a "miscarriage of justice." 433 U.S. at 91. See Spritzer, supra note 24, at 508 n.183.
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to the admission of a confession at trial.1 46 Despite the Court's failure to
define the content of the "cause" and "prejudice" standard, 147 this holding
furnishes support for the O'Berry court's view that procedural defaults may
totally preclude the vindication of constitutional rights, at least where those
14
rights do not bear upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
It is submitted, nevertheless, that the Fifth Circuit decision in O'Berry
has ignored the "full and fair" requirement contained within Stone's
"opportunity" test. 149 As the dissenting opinion in O'Berry accurately noted,
Stone was fundamentally concerned with the costs of permitting federal
relitigation of state court evidentiary rulings.150 The basic argument set
forth in Stone that state courts are "fair and competent" forums for the
adjudication of federal constitutional rights does not justify the result in
O'Berry, where- the petitioner's fourth amendment claims were never
adjudicated in state court.' 5' State court consideration on the merits can be
advanced as an element of "full" consideration of a fourth amendment claim
consistent with the Court's reliance on the fitness of state courts to protect
federal constitutional rights, 52 but it is submitted that a state court should
not to be allowed to abdicate its responsibility by avoiding the merits of a
federal constitutional claim on "non-federal" state grounds, particularly
153
where the effect is to preclude consideration on the merits in any forum.

Furthermore, the denial of a federal habeas forum to the petitioner in
O'Berry can hardly be considered "fair" in light of the fact that the
noncompliance with the contemporaneous objection rule was entirely the
responsibility of petitioner's court appointed counsel. 54 Placing the burden
146. 433 U.S. at 90-91.
147. Id. at 87. The Court observed that "[wie leave open for resolution in future
decisions the precise definition of the 'cause'-and-'prejudice' standard, and note here
only that it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in Fay." Id.
148. The fourth amendment claims raised by the habeas applicants in Stone and
O'Berry and the fifth amendment claim asserted by the petitioner in Wainwright were
not "guilt-related" in the sense that they had "no bearing on the basic justice of...
[the claimants'] incarceration." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491-92 n.31 (1976).
Consequently, a habeas applicant asserting such claims would be unable to make the
clear showing of "prejudice" mandated in Wainwright as necessary to gain access to
the federal habeas forum. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977).
149. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
150. 546 F.2d at 1219 (Goldberg, J., dissenting). See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
491 (1976).
151. See notes 82 & 90 and accompanying text supra.
152. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976).
153. Apparently a habeas applicant must force the state courts to confront the
merits of his fourth amendment claim by complying fully with state procedural rules
governing evidentiary objections. It is submitted that this requirement, however,
ignores the fact that a procedural default usually is not the product of a defendant's
conscious, reasoned refusal to abide by the legitimate processes of state courts. See
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 101 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also note
155 infra.
154. See 546 F.2d at 1207. As Justice Brennan recognized in his dissent in
Wainwright, Fay established that it cannot be assumed that a procedural default
"more often than not is the product of a defendant's conscious refusal to abide by the
duly constituted, legitimate processes of the state courts." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433
U.S. 72, 101 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). As in Wainwright, there is no basis in the
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of court appointed counsel's negligence or ignorance in failing to comply
with state procedural rules upon the petitioner in O'Berry, it is submitted,
did not constitute "fair" treatment under any reasonable due process
15
conception of fairness.
It is submitted that the O'Berry court erroneously extended Stone by
disregarding the right, recognized in Stone, of a criminal defendant to have
a state court deny admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence. 156 By
withdrawing the federal habeas forum as a means of ensuring that such
evidence is excluded, the O'Berry court established that a fourth amendment
claimant's "opportunity for full and fair litigation" under Stone may be
unknowingly forfeited even when a state court, in enforcing a procedural
rule, refuses to address the question of excluding unconstitutionally seized
evidence, a "remedy" left undisturbed by the Stone Court. 57
In Gates, the Second Circuit embraced an equally rigid interpretation of
Stone. The Gates court, consistent with the analysis employed by the Fifth
Circuit in O'Berry,1 8 resolved that Stone had overruled Fay with respect to
the deliberate bypass standard. 5 9 Under this view, Stone only imposes upon
state courts the obligation to provide adequate corrective procedures to
redress fourth amendment grievances; 60 once the opportunity to litigate
such claims is furnished, it may be forfeited by a simple procedural default
rather than by a knowing waiver. Although the Court's explicit limitation of
Fay in Wainwright perhaps supports this assessment of the conclusiveness
of procedural defaults,' 6 ' this view is not necessarily dispositive of Stone's
"opportunity" test. As the concurrence in Gates noted, the "full and fair"
element of the "opportunity" test clearly implies that the inquiry under
Stone should focus Vpon whether the state court "meaningfully considered"

O'Berry opinion for inferring that O'Berry or his court appointed counsel were even
aware of the existence of a possible fourth amendment claim during the trial, which
contributes to the conclusion that the procedural default in O'Berry was occasioned by
"a lawyer's simple error." Id. at 105 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
155. Justice Brennan, dissenting in Wainwright, argued that "any realistic theory
of federal habeas corpus jurisdiction must be premised on the reality that the ordinary
procedural default is borne of the inadvertence, negligence, inexperience, or
incompetence of trial counsel." Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104 (1977) (Brennan,
J., dissenting). These failures, according to Justice Brennan, are unfairly attributed to
a defendant since they "lie outside the power of the habeas petitioner to prevent or
deter and for which, under no view of morality or ethics, can he be held responsible."
Id. at 116 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally Hill, The Inadequate State Ground,
65 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 997 (1965).
156. See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
157. See O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204, 1221, 1223 (5th Cir.) (Goldberg, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
158. See text accompanying notes 70-84 supra.
159. 568 F.2d at 838. In his concurring opinion, Judge Oakes countered this
assertion by pointing out that the Stone court never stated that its decision was to
affect Fay in any way. Id. at 842 (Oakes, J., concurring).
160. Id. at 839.
161. 433 U.S. at 87-88. Noting that the cause and prejudice standard accepted by
the Court was narrower than Fay's deliberate bypass test, the majority confirmed
that "[i]t is the sweeping language of Fay v. Noia going far beyond the facts of the
case eliciting it, which we today reject." Id. (footnote omitted).
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a fourth amendment claim. 162 It is submitted that meaningful consideration
of a constitutional claim cannot be afforded unless the merits of that claim
are actually addressed in state court.
The decisions of the Gates and O'Berry courts had the unfortunate effect
of ensuring that the petitioners' respective fourth amendment claims would
never be heard on the merits. 16 3 The courts' analyses eliminated equitable
discretion as a factor in a judicial determination of the appropriateness of
federal habeas relief and thereby rejected the idea that a "fair" opportunity
to litigate includes an element of such discretion. 64 That equitable
discretion should play a role in determining fairness is supported by the fact
that Stone's limitation on the application of the exclusionary rule was
effected not by prescribing jurisdictional rules but by assessing the proper
functional relationship between a "judicially created remedy" and the
statutory right to habeas corpus review. 65 In both Stone and Wainwright,
the Court refrained from attacking the foundation principle, established by
Fay, "that in considering a petition for the writ of habeas corpus, federal
courts possess the power to look beyond a state procedural forfeiture in order
to entertain the contention that a defendant's constitutional rights have
been abridged.' 66 The essential question, therefore, relates to the standards
that should govern federal courts' discretion in exercising this power to
decide the constitutional claims of state prisoners. It is submitted that the
standard enunciated in Stone, consisting of a bare formulation of an
undefined "opportunity" test, has failed to provide such standards and has
permitted federal courts, in cases such as Gates and O'Berry, to make an
independent evaluation of the policies and values served by collateral review
on habeas corpus.
IV.

STATE COURT ADJUDICATION ON IMPROPER FOURTH
AMENDMENT GROUNDS

Another area in which this independent evaluation has contributed to
the apparent emasculation of fourth amendment rights involves the
situation in which the defendant presents a fourth amendment claim in
162. See 568 F.2d at 844 (Oakes, J., concurring).
163. Compare text accompanying note 82 supra with text accompanying note 106
supra.
164. It is submitted that judicial determination of whether a "fair" opportunity to
litigate has been afforded inevitably requires at least an implicit exercise of equitable
discretion since fairness cannot be defined in absolute terms. An attempt to apply the
"opportunity" test without regard to fairness considerations may result in the
anomalous situation postulated by Justice White in Stone, in which the operation of
the Stone test and the certiorari power of the Supreme Court would combine to
produce a clearly inequitable result. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 536-37 (1976)
(White, J., dissenting).
165. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 489-96 (1976). Justice Powell cautioned that
"[o]ur decision does not mean that the federal court lacks jurisdiction over . .. [a
fourth amefidment] claim". Id. at 495 n.37.
166. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 100 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting), citing
Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963) (emphasis by the Court). See also Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976).
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state court and subsequently obtains a disposition on the merits. Most
federal courts construing Stone's standard have held that federal habeas
167
review is clearly inappropriate in these circumstances.
Problems arise, however, in those situations in which the defendant
presents his fourth amendment claim in state court and the state court
resolves the merits of that claim on the basis of an allegedly erroneous
fourth amendment standard. Here the availability of federal habeas relief is
crucial, not only to the general protection of constitutional values, but also
to the vindication of fourth amendment rights in specific circumstances
evincing a clear violation of those rights. The question is whether the
alleged application of an improper constitutional standard is sufficient to
167. See, e.g., Hedden v. Wainwright, 558 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1977); Poliner v. Fogg,
438 F. Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Pierce v. Oklahoma, 436 F. Supp. 1026 (W.D. Okla.
1977); Davis v. Zahradnick, 432 F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Va. 1977); Bellew v. Gunn, 424 F.
Supp. 31 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
For example, in United States ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard, 426 F. Supp. 97
(S.D.N.Y. 1976), a federal district court rejected a habeas petitioner's attempt to
overturn a trial court's allegedly incorrect conclusions regarding his fourth
amendment claim challenging the validity of a wiretap order which led to the
petitioner's conviction for first-degree murder. Id. at 110. The one cognizable claim
advanced by the petitioner consisted of the allegation that his post-trial hearing,
addressing the issue of tainted evidence resulting from concededly illegal surveillance,
did not constitute an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment
claims under Stone. Id. at 103. To substantiate this claim, the petitioner presented
three arguments designed to show that the hearing was procedurally defective. First,
he contended that the state denied him the opportunity to examine relevant and
necessary material in accordance with Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1965),
and he was therefore prevented from demonstrating the existence of taint. 426 F.
Supp. at 103. Second, the petitioner alleged that the wiretap tapes were unavailable
because of bad faith on the part of law enforcement officials. Id. Third, he argued that
the trial court's curtailment of his right to cross-examination prevented him from
showing bad faith, knowledge of the police of the illegality of the wiretaps at the time
of their use, and a subsequent concealment of that bad faith. Id. The petitioner
maintained that all of these circumstances combined to qualify him for federal habeas
corpus relief under Stone. Id.
Emphasizing that the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to litigate his
claim through three levels of state court, the Conroy court applied Stone and rejected
the petition for habeas relief on the grounds that it "attacks the result of the state
court hearing, not the process by which that result was achieved." Id. at 110. The
court noted that "[p]etitioner has not demonstrated that the available state procedures
were inadequate or otherwise prevented him from presenting his claims, nor has he
shown that the conduct of the hearing judge circumvented those procedures." Id. at
109. Instead, he alleged that the hearing court's conclusions were incorrect and urged
that more favorable rulings be imposed on the state court by a federal court. Id. The
court concluded that the policies set forth in Stone regarding the relationship between
the exclusionary rule and habeas corpus clearly militated against such interference by
a federal court. Id. See generally Bator, supra note 3, at 455-60.
It is interesting to note that in the same district court a habeas petitioner's
attack on the probable cause supporting issuance of an eavesdropping warrant was
rejected notwithstanding the fact that the state appellate courts "remained silent"
with respect to the fourth amendment claims. Losinno v. Henderson, 420 F. Supp. 380
(S.D.N.Y. 1976). In Losinno, the court held that as long as the state court had
considered the merits of these claims, the full and fair opportunity test of Stone was
satisfied without any requirement that the state court specifically address each claim
in its opinion. Id. at 382. Significantly, the Losinno court evidenced a clear concern
that the state courts actually resolve the merits of the constitutional claims before
access to the federal forum should be foreclosed. Id.
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show the "unfairness" of the state appellate process in order to illustrate
that the litigant has not been afforded a "full and fair opportunity to
18
litigate" under Stone.
A. The Case Law
The most striking illustrations of the problems attendant to this
situation are presented by the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Holmberg v. Parratt169 and Hines v.
Auger. 17° In Holmberg, a state prisoner was convicted of possession of
narcotics with intent to distribute on the basis of evidence uncovered during
an allegedly illegal random stop of his automobile. 171 Upon his conviction,
the petitioner appealed to the state's highest appellate court on the grounds
that the random stop, although authorized by state statute, was made
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore violated his
fourth amendment rights. 172 The state court rejected this argument and
173
affirmed the conviction.
On the state's appeal from the grant of habeas corpus relief by the
district court, 74 the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that "[e]rroneous
application of Fourth Amendment principles by a state court is no longer
relevant to the question of whether the federal court may review the merits
of the claim.' 75 The Holmberg court read Stone as rendering state appellate
misapplication of the fourth amendment immaterial in determining whether
a petitioner was given an "opportunity" to litigate his claim. 7 6 Although the
Eighth Circuit implied that the petitioner's fourth amendment rights had
been violated, 177 the court directed petitioner's counsel to raise his
78
constitutional argument in a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.
168. See Note, Criminal Procedure, ANN. SURVEY

OF'AMER. LAw

111, 139-40

(1977).
169. 548 F.2d 745 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969 (1977).

170. 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977).
171. 548 F.2d at 745-46.
172. Id. at 746. The parties stipulated that a Nebraska state trooper had stopped
petitioner's vehicle solely to check his driver's license and registration. Id. This

random stop procedure was authorized by state statute. Id. See

NEB.

REV.

STAT.

§ 60-435 (1974).

173. 548 F.2d at 746. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction by

declining to read a reasonable cause requirement into the law. State v. Holmberg, 194
Neb. 337, 231 N.W.2d 672 (1975).
174. 548 F.2d at 746, citing Holmberg v. Parratt, Civ. No. 76-L-4 (D. Neb. June 23,

1976). The district court found that the random stop of the defendant's vehicle without
reasonable suspicion violated his fourth amendment rights. 548 F.2d at 746 (citations

omitted). If the district court was correct in its determination of the merits of the
fourth amendment claim, it is apparent that the state court applied an erroneous
fourth amendment standard in affirming the petitioner's conviction.
175. 548 F.2d at 746 (footnote omitted).

176. Id.
177. Id. This presumption flows from the court's discussion of the impact of
erroneous state court adjudications of fourth amendment claims upon the application
of the Stone standard.
178. Id. at 746-47. See note 241 infra. After exhausting the state appeal procedure,
a defendant convicted in state court may seek review of his conviction through adt
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The Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its commitment to this interpretation of
Stone in Hines v. Auger. 79 In Hines, a district court's grant of habeas relief
was reversed on the grounds that Stone's "opportunity" test had been
satisfied, and therefore consideration on the merits was inappropriate.'80
The petitioner and a codefendant had been convicted of possession of
narcotics discovered during a warrantless search of his automobile.' 8 '
Rejecting Hines' argument that no probable cause ever existed for the stop,
search, or seizure, the state courts ruled that the warrantless search and
seizure were justified by probable cause and exigent circumstances. 8 2 On
federal habeas review, the district court held that Hines was effectively
denied an adversary hearing in the highest state court on the issue of
probable cause because that court had relied upon his codefendant's decision
to "seemingly concede" the issue of probable cause. 83 Although admitting
that "we might disagree [with the state courts] as to the merits of the
petitioner's claim were we sitting as an appellate court of first resort,"' 8 4 the

application of certiorari to the Supreme Court. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS § 107 (3d ed. 1976). At the same time the defendant may file a habeas corpus
petition, pursuant to § 2254 of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970). See note 5
supra. The certiorari filing and the habeas corpus petition are entirely separate and
are not mutually exclusive.
The Holmberg court cited the companion case decided with Stone, Wolff v.
Rice, as support for its refusal to reach the merits of a valid fourth amendment claim.
548 F.2d at 746 n.1. The court pointed out that the Supreme Court had refused to
review the merits of the petitioner's claim in that case despite the clear violation of his
fourth amendment rights occasioned by an illegal search. Id. In a vigorous dissenting
opinion, however, Judge Bright distinguished the factual situation in Wolff from that
in Holmberg and argued that federal habeas review in the case at bar was justified
under Stone. Id. at 747-49 (Bright, J., dissenting). The dissent explained that the
petitioner in Wolff had sought review of the actions of individual state officers to
determine whether they had exceeded their authority in violation of petitioner's fourth
amendment rights. Id. at 748 (Bright, J., dissenting). Where officers of the state act
on the particular facts before them and that action is reviewed in state court, the
dissent recognized that no purpose would be served by the exercise of federal habeas
review. Id. In contrast, the police officer in Holmberg was authorized by state statute
to stop any motorist at random to examine his license or registration. The officer was
free to exercise his authority regardless of whether he had reason to suspect the
motorist of illegal activity and thus the estoppel rule set forth in Stone was
inapplicable to a situation in which a police officer has acted "pursuant to a general
state policy enacted by statute." Id.
179. 550 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1977).
180. Id. at 1097-98.
181. Id. at 1096.
182. Id. at 1096-97. The state trial and appellate courts determined that the
information furnished to the police by a reliable informant coupled with the officers'
observation of petitioner's conduct were sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest and
incident search. Id. See State v. Hines, 223 N.W.2d 190 (Iowa 1974); State v. Shea, 218
N.W.2d 610 (Iowa 1974).
183. 550 F.2d at 1097. The basis for this ruling was the state appellate court's
reliance on the earlier disposition of an appeal filed by the petitioner's companion on
the night in question, who was also convicted for possession of narcotics and who
"seemingly conced[ed]" the issue of probable cause. Id. See State v. Shea, 218 N.W.2d
610 (Iowa 1974).
184. 550 F.2d at 1099. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 269 (1973)
(Powell, J., concurring).
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Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of habeas relief, citing
Stone for its refusal to "second-guess our state brethren in cases such as this
18 5
which present murky questions of fourth amendment probable cause."'
Notwithstanding the petitioner's arguably legitimate claim, the Hines court
maintained that a proper construction of the Stone test must construe the
language used therein literally: "The emphasis of Stone is on the
opportunity for full and fair litigation, not upon the fullness or fairness of
the litigation.'

18 6
1

Consistent with its holding in Holmberg, the Eighth Circuit in Hines
interpreted Stone to mandate the withdrawal of federal habeas review where
the state court adjudicated the merits of a fourth amendment claim.
According to these cases, the soundness of the state disposition is
apparently immaterial to the question of whether Stone's opportunity to
litigate has been provided. Unfortunately, the Eighth Circuit is not the only
federal appellate court to adopt this rigid interpretation of Stone's
"opportunity" test. In Graves v. Estelle,187 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that Stone withdrew the discretion of a
federal district court to review the correctness of state court decisions
regarding the admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the
88
fourth amendment.
In Graves, the habeas petitioner was convicted for possession of heroin,
largely on the basis of evidence seized pursuant to a search of petitioner's
automobile. 8 9 The petitioner objected to the use of this evidence on the
grounds that the police had neither a warrant to stop and search the
automobile nor probable cause to arrest its occupants.' 9° The denial of the
petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence at trial was affirmed on appeal,
on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless stop of
the automobile.' 9' On habeas corpus review, the district court held that the
petitioner was entitled to relief under Stone, finding that the state court
ruling with respect to probable cause for the stop was not fairly supported by
the record. 19 2 The Fifth Circuit disagreed, holding that the district court's
reversal of the state court determination of probable cause violated Stone
since the petitioner had not demonstrated that the state did not furnish him
a full and fair opportunity to present his fourth amendment claim.' 9'
185.
186.
Servs.,
187.

550 F.2d at 1099.
Id. at 1097 (citation omitted). See also Denti v. Commissioner of Correctional
421 F. Supp. 557, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
556 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1977).

188. Id. at 745.
189. Id. at 744.

190. Id. Thus this case does not involve a litigant who, as in O'Berry, failed to
preserve a point of error at trial and therefore was unable to present his fourth
amendment claim to the state appellate court. Id. at 744 n.4. See notes 70 & 71 and
accompanying text supra.
191. 556 F.2d at 744-45.
192. Id. at 745.

193. Id. at 747. In light of the fact that a finding of probable cause required both
factual and legal determinations, the court refused to apply the second category of
Townsend by inquiring whether the state factual determination was fairly supported
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B. Analysis of Holmberg, Hines, and Graves
It is submitted that the Eighth Circuit's extension of Stone in Holmberg
and Hines ignored the symbiotic relationship between a proper application
of fourth amendment standards and the fundamental fairness of state
litigation. A state court's erroneous interpretation of fourth amendment
standards clearly affects the fairness of the state proceeding and violates
the accused's constitutional rights.19 4 It is implausible to contend that a
state prisoner has been afforded a "full ind fair opportunity to litigate"
under Stone when the state procedures available to protect constitutional
rights fail to perform their function in accordance with constitutional
principles. 195
Since the petitioner in Holmberg presented a claim involving an issue
that had no bearing on the "basic justice" of his incarceration,' 96 the
availability of federal collateral review might have impelled the state courts
reviewing Holmberg's claims to "toe the constitutional line."' 97 Indeed, the
result in Holmberg furnishes convincing support for the view espoused by
Justice Harlan in his dissenting opinion in Desist v. United States:98 "[T]he
threat of habeas serves as a necessary additional incentive for trial and
appellate courts throughout the land to conduct their proceedings in a
manner consistent with established constitutional standards."'199 It is
by the record as a whole. Id. at 745-46. See text accompanying note 51 supra. The
court posited that its conclusion was consistent with the policies supporting Stone:
To allow a federal district court to overrule a state court's resolution of whether
there was or was not probable cause so as to admit or exclude evidence obtained
by a particular search flies in the teeth of the Stone v. Powell declaration that
henceforth we shall regard state judges to be as capable as federal judges to
uphold the values of the fourth amendment.
556 F.2d at 746 (footnote omitted).
194. Cf. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) (reference to incorrect fifth
amendment standard violates due process). One commentator has advanced the

argument that "egregious" fourth amendment violations which are not corrected on
state review should be cognizable under Stone if the habeas petitioner can show: 1)
that the constitutional standard is a "clear" one; 2) that it is "clearly" applicable to
petitioner's case; and 3) that the state appellate court failed to apply it or applied it
improperly. See Note, supra note 168, at 140.

195. One of the essential underpinnings of the Stone decision was the Court's
assumption that state courts are capable of protecting federal constitutional rights.
See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). It is submitted, however, that
decisions such as Holmberg tend to discredit that presumption.
A recent law review note questioned whether the withdrawal of habeas review
signified by Stone would result in decreased protection of constitutional rights:
Whether or not those constitutional rights excluded from habeas corpus

review are accorded the preeminent status that they clearly deserve will depend
on the accuracy of the Court's assumption that state courts can and will
recognize their duty to give vigorous protection to the constitutional rights of the
accused. Indeed, only if this assumption proves correct can the construction of a

balance which allows concerns with federalism and state autonomy to outweigh
increased protection of constitutional rights be ultimately justified.

The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30, at 221.

196. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.31 (1976).
197. See Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 264 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
198. 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
199. Id. at 262-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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inconsistent with the long established function of federal habeas corpus to
permit a state court to "have the last say when it, though on fair
consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have
''2
misconceived a federal constitutional right. 00
Finally, the Holmberg decision is difficult to justify when examined in
light of the federal habeas statute. 20 1 Section 2241(c) of Title 28 of the United
States Code provides in pertinent part that: "The writ of habeas corpus shall
not extend to a prisoner unless . . .[h]e is in custody in violation of the

Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. ' '202 A state prisoner,
such as the petitioner in Holmberg, is held in violation of federal law when
the "state courts have erroneously decided a federal question bearing
dispositively on the judgment authorizing the detention." 2 3 It follows that
the statute authorizes federal habeas review to test the merits of the
dispositive federal question decided erroneously by a state court. It is
submitted that by severing access to the federal forum in such circumstances, the Holmberg court contravenes this statutory authorization and
overextends Stone's estoppel rule.
The particular difficulty presented by Hines and Graves arises out of the
fact that the state court determinations at issue exclusively concerned the
existence of probable cause. 20 4 Although a probable cause determination
necessitates conclusions of law, the presence of a fourth amendment
violation in such a judgment is not as clear as that presented by the
overbroad state statute involved in Holmberg.20 5 Moreover, the district
court's examination of the record for purposes of evaluating the factual
support for the state court's probable cause determination appears
inappropriate under Stone.20 6 Hines and Graves, unlike Holmberg, do not

200. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 508 (1953) (Frankfurter, J.).
201. See note 5 supra.
202. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970).

203. Bator, supra note 3, at 445. Professor Bator observed that "[t]he conclusion
that a federal court should, at some point, have the power to decide the merits of all
federal constitutional questions arising in state criminal proceedings . . .may be a
sound one, resting on the specific institutional and political premises of our
constitutional federalism." Id. In light of Stone, this conclusion appears to have been

rejected, particularly if the Stone rationale is extended to include constitutional rights
other than those protected by the fourth amendment. See The Supreme Court, 1975
Term, supra note 30, at 217-21. See also Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1
(1977) (Powell, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426-29 (1977) (Burger,
C. J., dissenting).
204. See text accompanying notes 182-85 & 190-93 supra.

205. See notes 171-78 and accompanying text supra.
206. Stone clearly does not authorize a federal court on habeas review to make an
independent assessment of the factual support for a constitutional claim. See Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 474-96 (1976). As the Graves court pointed out, the record in
Stone did not even reveal the grounds upon which the state court rejected Powell's
claim. 556 F.2d at 746 n.8. When the fact that only a single state judge ever addressed
the validity of the vagrancy ordinance at issue in Stone is considered as well, Justice
Brennan's doubt as to whether there is any real content to Stone's "exception" for
allowing habeas review when an opportunity for a full and fair resolution of a fourth
amendment claim has been denied seems warranted. See 428 U.S. at 531 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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clearly demonstrate how Stone's estoppel rule can be used to deny a state
prisoner due process of law. The trend of lower federal court decisions
2°7
following Stone has been to adopt the Holmberg and Graves rationale.
These decisions have insulated fourth amendment claims from federal
habeas review where the defendant presented his claim in state court and
the court resolved that claim by applying its conception of the proper fourth
amendment standard, regardless of whether that standard is a constitutional one. 208
Normally state court procedures are adequate to permit litigation of
fourth amendment claims, and in the vast majority of cases such claims are
in fact litigated in state court. 209 As the recent decisions in Holmberg,Hines
207. See, e.g., Taylor v. Riddle, 563 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977); Pobliner v. Fogg, 438 F.
Supp. 890 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).

208. See, e.g., Hedden v. Wainwright, 558 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1977); Denti v.

Commissioner of Correctional Servs., 421 F. Supp. 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). See also
Dupont v. Hall, 555 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1977). In Dupont, the First Circuit held that
federal court review of allegedly erroneous probable cause determinations by state
courts would be violative of the whole rationale of the Stone decision. Id. at 17. The
Dupont court never reached the question of the existence of probable cause under the
standards imposed by the fourth amendment. Id.
209. Federal courts have nevertheless recognized that in some circumstances
federal habeas review is clearly warranted even under the restrictive standard
imposed by Stone. See Gates v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir. 1977) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978). For example, if a federal habeas petitioner were precluded
from raising his fourth amendment claim in state court because of the lack of suitable
procedures, then the state court's failure to dispose of the claim on the merits requires
the federal courts to perform that function of collateral review. See United States ex
rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976), rev'd., 562 F.2d 903 (3d Cir.
1977). It is submitted that the Stone decision was not designed to eliminate federal
habeas review when there has been a "failure of process" in the state court system; in
other words, when "the conditions under which a question was litigated were not
fairly and rationally adopted for the reaching of a correct solution of any issue of fact
or law." Bator, supra note 3, at 455. Professor Bator cites the following situations as
examples of this "failure of process": 1) the trial judge was bribed to convict; 2) a mob
is alleged to have dominated the trial court and jury; 3) the defendant was forced to
plead guilty through torture; or 4) there was knowing use of perjured testimony by the
prosecution. Id. at 457.
Under Stone federal courts are free, indeed obligated, to inquire "whether the
conditions and tools of inquiry [available in state court] were such as to assure a
reasoned probability that the facts were correctly found and the law correctly
applied." Id. at 455. If the state has failed to provide this corrective process, Stone's
"opportunity" test cannot be satisfied. See Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 333-36
(1915). Of course the complete absence of state procedures available to litigate a claim
would be an obvious basis for the exercise of federal habeas review under Stone.
Professor Bator states unequivocally that
if a state fails to give the defendant any opportunity at all to test federal defenses
relevant to his case, the need for a collateral jurisdiction to afford this
opportunity would seem to be plain, and federal habeas is clearly an appropriate
remedy: the state has furnished no process, much less "due" process, for the

vindication of an alleged federal right.

Bator, supra note 3, at 456-57.
Not surprisingly, however, a total lack of appropriate state procedural
mechanisms is rare. In United States ex rel. Petillo v. New Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686
(D.N.J. 1976), rev'd, 562 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977), the district court ruled that the state of
New Jersey failed to provide any opportunity at all for the subject of a search to
litigate his fourth amendment claim in state court. 418 F. Supp. at 688-89. Under an
unusual state procedural rule, the subject of a search was denied the right to a hearing
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and Graves demonstrate, however, federal courts under the rubric of Stone
have seemingly ignored erroneous determinations of fourth amendment
claims by state courts. 210 This development suggests that the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule is no longer a "constitutional claim" within
the scope of habeas corpus.21 ' If, as one commentator has warned, the Stone
opinion is not logically limited to the fourth amendment context, Stone and
its progeny may signify an ominous redefinition of the function of federal
habeas corpus review - a redefinition that places a higher premium on
federalism and the efficient use of judicial resources than on the protection
21 2
of constitutional rights.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is submitted that the decisions which have considered the propriety of
federal habeas corpus review of a state prisoner's fourth amendment claims
under Stone v. Powell have confirmed Justice Brennan's fear that Stone laid
the groundwork for a broad withdrawal of federal habeas jurisdiction. 2 3 The
need for a more precise articulation of the standards governing the proper
exercise of federal habeas review, therefore, remains after Stone, since it is

concerning the veracity of an affidavit supporting the issuance of a search warrant.
Id. at 688. Consequently, the petitioner was never afforded an opportunity to protect
his constitutional right to suppress the fruits of an allegedly illegal search. Id. at
688-89. According to the district court, these circumstances placed the petitioner
"squarely within the remaining ambit of application of the exclusionary rule on
collateral review" under Stone, and therefore entitled him to habeas relief. Id. This
ruling, however, was later overturned on appeal on the grounds that the petitioner

was not prejudiced by the operation of New Jersey's "Petillo" rule and was afforded a
fair opportunity to litigate his claim at trial and on direct review. Petillo v. New
Jersey, 562 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1977). Cf. United States ex rel. Conroy v. Bombard, 426
F. Supp. 97, 109 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Stone did not preclude consideration of habeas
petitioner's claim that state court illegal wiretapping hearing was procedurally

defective).

A similar approach was exhibited by the district court in Curry v. Garrison,
423 F. Supp. 109 (W.D.N.C. 1976), in which the court determined that the petitioners
were denied an opportunity to litigate their fourth amendment claim because they
were never allowed to develop the facts material to such a claim. Id. at 110. Since the
essential factual background to the claim of illegal search and seizure was never
established, the state courts refrained from making any finding of fact regarding the
fourth amendment claim. Id.
The district court accordingly ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held in
federal court so as to enable it to consider the merits of petitioner's claim. Id. Cf. Gates
v. Henderson, 568 F.2d 844 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 830 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1038 (1978) (court ruled that the trial court had failed to develop
evidence crucial to determination of petitioner's constitutional claim as required by
Townsend). For a discussion of the panel majority's opinion issued by the Second
Circuit in Gates, which was later reversed, en banc, see Note, ConstitutionalLaw Criminal Procedure - Circuits Split Over Application of Stone v. Powell's
"Opportunity for Full and Fair Litigation", 30 VAND. L. REV. 881, 884-86 (1977).

210. See text accompanying notes 169-93 supra.

211. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30, at 218, citing United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
212. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30, at 220-21.
213. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 535 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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submitted that the Court's vague formulation of an "opportunity" test has
confused the relationship between procedural protections and substantive
rights. Evidence of this confusion is found in lower federal court decisions
such as O'Berry,214 Gates,215 and Holmberg,211 in which the Court's failure to
delimit the boundaries and purposes of the "opportunity" test has permitted
habeas corpus
the restriction of federal habeas review in situations in which
21 7
has traditionally performed the most valuable service.
Specifically, it is submitted that these decisions have failed to recognize
that the Supreme Court presupposed two basic conditions essential to the
invocation of Stone-type estoppel: 1) that state courts would resolve fourth
amendment claims in accordance with prevailing constitutional standards
to ensure protection of fourth amendment rights; and 2) that state prisoners
would raise these claims as prescribed by state statutory procedures, thereby
ensuring that at least one forum resolves the merits of the claims.
The first presumption derives from the Stone Court's belief that state
courts can be trusted to effectuate fourth amendment values through fair
application of the exclusionary rule.218 However, the anomalous consequences of proposing a procedural test that presupposes a uniform result are
revealed by decisions like Holmberg, in which the state courts apparently
failed to apply a proper fourth amendment standard. 219 Though it is difficult
to believe that the Stone Court intended to sanction this refusal to accord
proper respect to fourth amendment rights, the Holmberg court interpreted
the "opportunity" test as authorizing federal courts to virtually ignore these
errors. 220 This reduction in the availability of federal habeas review places a
heavy burden on state courts to provide guarantees heretofore afforded by
federal courts. 221 More importantly, it is submitted that the Holmberg
extension of Stone violates the incarcerated individual's due process right to
a fair trial by permitting state courts to admit unconstitutionally222seized
evidence and to thus act in flagrant disregard of the Constitution.
214. See text accompanying notes 70-93 supra.
215. See text accompanying notes 94-120 supra.
216. See text accompanying notes 169 & 171-78 supra.
217. Federal habeas review performs the most valuable service when it rectifies
constitutional errors committed by state courts or addresses the merits of a
constitutional claim theretofor ignored by state courts. See generally Comment, 23
N.Y.L.ScH. L. REV. 119, 127-31 (1977). The fact that the federal habeas court is
"lodged in a different institutional setting [than a state court], with different loyalties
and assumptions which may foster greater hospitality to constitutional goals"
supports the use of the federal forum as "the separate proceeding which tests the
constitutional basis of the conviction, not the prisoner's guilt or innocence."
Developments, supra note 1, at 1060-61.
218. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-94 n.35 (1976). See also note 43 and
accompanying text supra.
219. See text accompanying notes 169 & 171-78 supra.
220. See Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977). See also text accompanying note 176 supra.
221. See Comment, ProtectingFundamentalRights in State Courts: Fittinga State
Peg To A Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C. R. - C. L. L. REv. 63, 84 (1977).

222. See Comment, supra note 217, at 130. Justice Brandeis warned of the danger
to a free society caused by this disregard of law:
In a government of laws, existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, the omni-present

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1978

37

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 5 [1978], Art. 4

1132

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

23

Yet the Holmberg rationale finds support in the argument that after
Stone federal courts may not first look to see if a state court properly decided
the merits of a fourth amendment claim before determining if the
opportunity to raise that claim was "full and fair. '223 Even if Stone's
procedural standard cannot be defined in terms of protection of substantive
rights, however, it is nonetheless submitted that the extent to which state
processes actually protect substantive rights in a given case is not irrelevant
to a serious examination of procedural fairness. 224 A federal habeas court
could thus review state court determinations of fourth amendment claims on
the ground that the opportunity to litigate was undermined by the
application of a clearly erroneous fourth amendment standard in state court.
With respect to the second presumption mentioned above, it is submitted
that the Stone Court did not anticipate the use of the "opportunity" test to
entirely preclude judicial review of fourth amendment claims. The Stone
decision, when considered in light of its facts and the reasoning supporting
its holding, 225 sought to remove the federal habeas forum only from those
defendants who properly raised and litigated constitutional claims in state
courts. 226

Federal court decisions such as O'Berry and Gates reveal,

however, that the "opportunity" test may operate to permit the waiver of
constitutional rights by defendants failing to comply, for whatever reason,
with state procedural rules. 227 The courts are seemingly construing Stone to

mean that providing a defendant an opportunity to litigate his claim
precludes habeas relief, regardless of whether or not the opportunity was
exercised. 22 This construction of the Stone test may have the unfortunate
effect of ensuring that no court hears the merits of the respective
constitutional claims, as happened in Gates and O'Berry.229 Furthermore,
teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for the
law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To
declare that in the administration of criminal law the end justifies the means to declare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the
conviction of a private criminal would bring terrible retribution. Against this
pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
223. See Holmberg v. Parratt, 548 F.2d 745, 746 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977).
224. If state processes result in the incarceration of a defendant in violation of his
fourth amendment right to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence at trial, the
fairness of the state litigation is inevitably brought into question. See Note, supra
note 168, at 140. See generally text accompanying notes 149-55 supra.
225. See notes 27-43 and accompanying text supra. In Stone the state courts had
resolved the merits of the habeas petitioners' constitutional claims. 428 U.S. at 470,
472. Thus the Court's cost/benefit analysis focused on the value of relitigating these
claims on federal habeas review. Id. at 489.
226. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1076. See text accompanying note
124 supra.
227. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
228. Cf. Bradley v. Cowan, 561 F.2d 1213, 1218 (6th Cir. 1977) (Weick, J.,

concurring) (since petitioner was afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate his
fourth amendment claim and also exercised that opportunity, he is precluded from
habeas relief under Stone).
229. See text accompanying notes 126-31 supra.
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this approach injects an element of waiver into the Stone test without a
serious assessment of the implications of the waiver doctrine on the
redundancy principles which have formed the foundation of habeas corpus
by allowing two independent courts to address a defendant's claim of
constitutional error, 230 and without regard to the actual cause of the failure
231
to exercise the opportunity to litigate.
It is arguable that the Gates and O'Berry courts appear to have
anticipated the current trend of Supreme Court habeas jurisprudence. The
most striking feature of this trend is the apparent convergence of the StoneWainwright analyses permitting the "binding forfeiture" of constitutional
rights 232 - which if allowed to continue might restrict federal habeas review
of constitutional claims other than those derived from the fourth amendment. 23 3 Several Supreme Court justices have proposed the extension of
Stone to exclude federal habeas review of other non-"guilt-related"
constitutional rights,2 34 and Wainwright has directly limited Fay by

230. The Warren Court's expansion of habeas corpus produced the active
participation of federal courts in the protection and articulation of constitutional
rights, thereby generating "a dialogue on the future of constitutional requirements in
criminal law in which state and federal courts were required both to speak and listen
as equals." Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1036. The Warren Court chose
redundancy as its remedial strategy to insure "the fullest opportunity for plenary
federal judicial review" of federal constitutional claims. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424
(1963) See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1036. Professor Cover specified the
following advantages of redundancy as the guiding principle of habeas corpus: 1) it
encourages the "vindication of federal rights by isolating them from other elements in
the criminal process and making them the special concern of a special forum;" 2) it
increases the certainty that constitutional rights will not be erroneously denied by
establishing "a biased decision rule against convictions with erroneous adjudications
of constitutional rights;" 3) it encourages more solicitous treatment of federal
constitutional claims by state courts; and 4) it stimulates the states "to develop and
improve procedures for the adjudication and protection of constitutional rights." Id. at
1045-46. See generally Wright & Sofaer, FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners:
The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility, 75 YALE L. J. 895, 898 & n.14 (1966);
Brennan, Federal Habeas Corpus and State Prisoners:An Exercise in Federalism, 7
UTAH L. REv. 423, 442 (1961); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive
State Proceeding,74 HARV. L. REv. 1315, 1352-54 (1961); Developments, supra note 1,
at 1057. As recent habeas corpus decisions reveal, however, redundancy is no longer
the guiding principle for the Burger Court in defining the function of federal habeas
review. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465
(1976); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501
(1976). See generally Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1072-78.
231. Justice Brennan has emphasized that the ordinary procedural default in state
court, which in Gates and O'Berry led to the waiver of the defendant's opportunity to
litigate their constitutional claims, is caused by the inadvertence, negligence,
inexperience, or incompetence of trial counsel. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 104
(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). He argues persuasively that a lawyer's mistake
should not ipso facto forfeit a defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 105 (Brennan,
J., dissenting). This issue was inexplicably avoided by both the Gates and O'Berry
courts.
232. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 107 (1977); O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546
F.2d 1204, 1220 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 911 (1977).
233. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30, at 217-21.
234. In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), Chief Justice Burger urged that
Stone be extended to exclude federal habeas review of Miranda violations. Id. at
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implying waiver of a fifth amendment claim absent a showing of "cause"
and "prejudice" for failure to raise an objection in accordance with state
procedural rules. 2 35 In addition, two recent Supreme Court decisions
demonstrate that the failure to raise federal constitutional claims at the
23
appropriate time in state court may bar federal habeas review. 6 Signifi-

426-28 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
Chief Justice criticized the majority for "mechanically applying the exclusionary
rule" and granting habeas relief to a state prisoner on the ground that his inculpatory
statements were involuntary and should have been excluded from trial. 430 U.S. at
420-25 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice reasoned that the evidence
obtained by virtue of police conduct such as that found to be unconstitutional by the
majority was independently valid and probative of guilt and thus should not be
excluded by operation of the exclusionary rule on collateral review. Id. at 418-20
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell, concurring specially, declined to apply Stone
because it had been decided subsequent to the lower court decisions in the case and
the Stone principle had not been briefed nor adequately argued. Id. at 413-14 (Powell,
J., concurring). It should be noted, however, that Justice Powell implied skepticism as
to the general applicability of the Stone rationale in the fifth and sixth amendment
contexts:
Many Fifth and Sixth Amendment claims arise in the context of challenges to
the fairness of a trial or to the integrity of the fact-finding process ....

Whether

the rationale of Stone should be applied to those Fifth and Sixth Amendment
claims or classes of claims that more closely parallel claims under the Fourth
Amendment is a question as to which I intimate no view, and which should be
resolved only after the implications of such a ruling have been fully explored.
Id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring). See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1088-89.
Justice Powell has nevertheless stated that Stone should be applied to claims
of discrimination in grand jury matters since these claims may be "mooted" by a
retrial. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 508 n.1 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting).
The Ninth Circuit has refused to extend the Stone rationale to bar federal
habeas review of double jeopardy claims. Corley v. Cardwell, 544 F.2d 349 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1048 (1977). See also Tisnado v. United States, 547 F.2d
452 (9th Cir. 1976). A federal district court, however, applied Stone to preclude habeas
review of a Miranda claim where the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his claim in state courts. Richardson v. Stone, 421 F. Supp. 577 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
235. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87-90 (1977). Cf. Davis v. United States,
411 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1973) (refusal to apply Fay standards where recognition of the
claim would nullify an express statutory waiver provision).
236. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S.
501 (1976).
In Francis, a black defendant convicted of felony murder filed for federal
habeas relief on the basis of a claim, never raised in state court notwithstanding the
requirement under state law that such claims be raised before trial, that the state's
system of selecting a grand jury constituted racial discrimination. 425 U.S. at 538.
After the district court granted relief, the Fifth Circuit vacated the ruling and
remanded for a finding of whether the state's exclusion of a disproportionate number
of blacks was prejudicial. Newman v. Henderson 496 F.2d 896, 898 (5th Cir. 1974),
aff'd sub nom. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 56 (1976).
Affirming the circuit court, the Supreme Court held that a collateral attack
upon the conviction required "not only a showing of 'cause' for the defendant's failure
to challenge the composition of the grand jury before trial, but also a showing of
actual prejudice." 425 U.S. at 542 (footnote omitted). One commentator has pointed
out that if this prejudice requirement required habeas applicants to show a causal
relationship between the defect in composition of the grand jury and the decision to
indict, grand jury challenges in habeas proceedings will be effectively barred. Cover &
Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1076 & n.192.
In Estelle the habeas petitioner claimed that his trial was unconstitutional
because he was forced to appear in prison clothes. 425 U.S. at 502. Although the
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cantly, the objections raised after trial in these cases were deemed so
unimportant that the defendants' unintentional waiver of their claims
barred all state and federal review.2 37 This was the approach adopted by the
Gates and O'Berry courts in injecting a waiver element into Stone's
"opportunity" test in cases involving fourth amendment claims.

23

It is

submitted, however, that the application of the waiver doctrine to Stone's
test is inappropriate since the Stone Court never confronted the prohibitive
239
consequences of the failure to raise constitutional claims in state court.
240
If the convergence of the Stone and Wainwright tests is completed, the
result would be an almost total evisceration of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction over claims unrelated to a defendant's guilt or innocence. 241 In
addition, if the "cause" and "prejudice" standard followed in Wainwright is
included in Stone's "opportunity" test, a state prisoner will rarely, if ever, be

defendant had made a futile request to his jailer to permit him to wear civilian clothes
at trial, no objection regarding the prison garb was raised at trial. Id. After his
conviction for assault with intent to murder with malice, the defendant unsuccessfully
sought habeas relief in federal district court on the ground that trial in prison clothes
constituted a denial of due process. Id. at 503. On review the Fifth Circuit held that
trial in prison garb was not harmless error. Williams v. Estelle, 500 F.2d 206, 210-12
(5th Cir. 1974), reu'd, 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that compelling a defendant to attend
trial in prison clothes was a denial of due process but that the defendant's failure to
make a timely objection at trial in this case negates the inference of coercion. 425 U.S.
at 508-10. Although Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, did not employ the
language of waiver, it has been suggested that "his requirement of coercion together
with his inference of noncoercion from the failure to object is the functional
equivalent of a waiver rule in which a claim of right is deemed waived if not raised or
invoked in timely fashion." Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1073-74.
237. See Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 36, at 1076.

238. See text accompanying note 12 supra.

239. See notes 150-53 and accompanying text supra. See also Cover & Aleinikoff,

supra note 36, at 1076.
240. It is not unreasonable to anticipate that this convergence will be consum-

mated. In Wainwright, where the basis of the constitutional claim was so
fundamental as the voluntariness of a confession, the Court denied habeas review on
the basis of the operation of a state contemporaneous objection rule. 433 U.S. at 86-87.
To enforce a similar contemporaneous objection rule in a case raising a fourth
amendment claim, in which the reliability of evidence is not brought into question,
would therefore be even more justifiable. In either case, federal habeas relief would

seem to be barred absent a showing of "cause" and "prejudice" attendant to the

procedural default. See id. at 87-90.
241. If federal habeas review were barred, as a practical matter no federal court

would address the merits of a state prisoner's constitutional claim. Justice Brennan

pointed out that "institutional constraints totally preclude any possibility that [the
Supreme] Court can adequately oversee whether state courts have properly applied
federal law." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 526 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
Another commentator has observed that the certiorari procedure of the
Supreme Court is entirely inadequate to review most state court decisions: "[T]he
ultimate right of a state criminal defendant to have a federal court and federal judges
pass upon his federal contentions cannot be secured solely by the Supreme Court's
power to review state judgments. The sheer volume of cases is enough to preclude it."
Reitz, FederalHabeas Corpus: PostconvictionRemedy for State Prisoners,108 U. PA.
L. REv. 461, 464 (1960).
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able to secure federal habeas review, notwithstanding the merit of his
2
constitutional claim. 42

In any event, the current trend of Supreme Court decisions regarding
habeas corpus and the lower federal court response thereto appears to
herald a significant restructuring of the function of federal habeas corpus
review. The Stone Court, however, suggested that one of the functions of
habeas corpus is to provide a remedy for "whatever society deems to be
intolerable restraints. ' 243 It is submitted that the concept of "intolerable
restraint" should not be limited exclusively to the incarceration of an
innocent person. 244 It should also extend to a concern for the fundamental
fairness and justice of permitting state courts to adjudicate defendants'
claims without regard to constitutional standards and to imply the waiver of
constitutional rights without regard to the defendants' knowledge of or
control over procedural defaults.
Charles D. Ossola
242. Habeas review would be foreclosed because petitioners asserting non-"guiltrelated" constitutional claims would be unable to demonstrate that the alleged
constitutional error actually prejudiced their adjudication. By definition, constitutional claims unrelated to guilt or innocence are nonprejudicial. Significantly,
however, the lower federal courts have had difficulty in determining precisely what
constitutes "cause" and "prejudice." See, e.g., Crowell v. Zahradnick, 571 F.2d 1257
(4th Cir. 1977) (Winter, J., dissenting); Jiminez v. Estelle, 557 F.2d 506, 510-11 (5th
Cir. 1977).
243. 428 U.S. at 492 n.31, quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401-02 (1963).
244. In other words, the concept of "intolerable restraint" may embrace concerns
"not only with the accuracy of the fact-finding but also with the fairness and justice
of the process itself." The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, supra note 30, at 220.
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